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Abstract
Worms are malicious programs that spread over the Internet without human
intervention. Since worms generally spread faster than humans can respond,
the only viable defence is to automate their detection.
Network intrusion detection systems typically detect worms by examining
packet or flow logs for known signatures. Not only does this approach mean
that new worms cannot be detected until the corresponding signatures are
created, but that mutations of known worms will remain undetected because
each mutation will usually have a different signature. The intuitive and
seemingly most effective solution is to write more generic signatures, but
this has been found to increase false alarm rates and is thus impractical.
This dissertation investigates the feasibility of using machine learning
to automatically detect mutations of known worms. First, it investigates
whether Support Vector Machines can detect mutations of known worms.
Support Vector Machines have been shown to be well suited to pattern recog-
nition tasks such as text categorisation and hand-written digit recognition.
Since detecting worms is effectively a pattern recognition problem, this work
investigates how well Support Vector Machines perform at this task.
The second part of this dissertation compares Support Vector Machines
to other machine learning techniques in detecting worm mutations. Gaussian
Processes, unlike Support Vector Machines, automatically return confidence
values as part of their result. Since confidence values can be used to reduce
false alarm rates, this dissertation determines how Gaussian Process compare
to Support Vector Machines in terms of detection accuracy. For further
comparison, this work also compares Support Vector Machines to K-nearest
neighbours, known for its simplicity and solid results in other domains.
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The third part of this dissertation investigates the automatic generation of
training data. Classifier accuracy depends on good quality training data – the
wider the training data spectrum, the higher the classifier’s accuracy. This
dissertation describes the design and implementation of a worm mutation
generator whose output is fed to the machine learning techniques as training
data. This dissertation then evaluates whether the training data can be used
to train classifiers of sufficiently high quality to detect worm mutations.
The findings of this work demonstrate that Support Vector Machines can
be used to detect worm mutations, and that the optimal configuration for
detection of worm mutations is to use a linear kernel with unnormalised
bi-gram frequency counts. Moreover, the results show that Gaussian Pro-
cesses and Support Vector Machines exhibit similar accuracy on average in
detecting worm mutations, while K-nearest neighbours consistently produces
lower quality predictions. The generated worm mutations are shown to be
of sufficiently high quality to serve as training data. Combined, the results
demonstrate that machine learning is capable of accurately detecting muta-
tions of known worms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The worm problem
Worms are malicious programs that spread over the Internet without human
intervention [1, 2]. Like some biological viruses they infect hosts through
known weaknesses, cause what damage they can, and then use the host as a
springboard to find other vulnerable victims.
The first Internet worm was unleashed in 1988 and brought down hun-
dreds of machines across the USA [3], at the time a significant portion of
the early Internet. Worms proliferated as the Internet matured into a global
network, wreaking havoc and causing considerable financial damage [4].
None of the damage, however, came close to the $2.6 billion caused by
Code Red [5, 6]. Code Red exploited a vulnerability in Microsoft’s Internet
Information Services (IIS) [7] web server to infect its victims. The first, rather
unsuccessful version of Code Red, attempted to spread itself by generating
a set of random IP addresses that it then tried to infect. Yet, there was a
fatal flaw in this version: it used a static seed to generate the IP addresses,
which meant that all infected hosts generated the same set of IP addresses.
This flaw prevented the worm from spreading far.
Several days after Code Red’s arrival, a change in its behaviour was ob-
served: it began to probe new hosts. The change in behaviour was due to an
updated version of Code Red, identical in all aspects except for the random
1
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number generator, which now used a dynamic random seed. This mutation
enabled it to infect 359, 000 hosts in less than 14 hours [6].
A worm that spread even faster was the Slammer [8] worm, which in-
fected most of its 75, 000 victims within 10 minutes. This worm was the first
Warhol [9] worm observed in the wild, a name coined from Andy Warhol’s fa-
mous quote that “in the future, everybody will have 15 minutes of fame” [10],
and based on the worm’s ability to spread to most vulnerable machines within
15 minutes.
Despite their prominence, Code Red and Slammer are just two of the
more infamous worms drawn from the large pool of lethal worms that have
swamped the Internet over the last decade. Study of those worms leads to
the following observations about worm behaviour:
• the initial release of each worm is typically followed by one or more
mutations
• each mutation tends to be more lethal than its predecessors, by refining
the attack or infection strategy
• they spread significantly faster than humans can respond
These observations suggest that an attractive defence strategy against worms
is to automate the detection of their mutations, and this strategy is the focus
of this dissertation.
Today’s network intrusion detection systems [11] – software designed to
detect security breaches such as worms – typically use either anomaly de-
tection or misuse detection. Anomaly detection [12] systems model normal
traffic and detect intrusions by looking for abnormalities. But normal traffic
is often hard to model, especially with traffic such as peer-to-peer and email
relaying exhibiting worm-like characteristics. Misuse detection [13] systems
match network traffic to models of intrusions known as signatures, which
means that only intrusions whose signatures are known can be detected.
Although there is substantial ongoing research into improving anomaly
detection systems, misuse detection systems have emerged as the de facto
standard since they are both simple and scalable. When it comes to rapidly
spreading intrusions such as worms, however, misuse detection systems have
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Figure 1.1: Automatically detecting worm mutations with ma-
chine learning. The learning phase is trained with network flows
labelled as malicious or benign (top), producing a classifier that
can distinguish between malicious and benign flows (bottom).
a serious limitation: generating the signature itself [14]. Signatures are typ-
ically created by security experts who manually analyse network logs after
intrusions have occurred, a time consuming and error-prone task. Given the
ferociousness of today’s worms, by the time a signature has been handcrafted
the worm may have already spread to the far ends of the Internet.
This work proposes to use machine learning based pattern recognition
techniques to eliminate that bottleneck with regard to worm mutations. The
idea is to train a machine learning classifier to distinguish between worm
(malicious) and benign flows, and so avoid the need to explicitly generate
signatures; by finding distinguishing patterns, machine learning techniques
implicitly generate signatures to classify unknown flows as malicious or be-
nign (Figure 1.1). In particular, this work investigates:
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• Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [15] are a machine learning
technique known to perform particularly well at pattern recognition
tasks such as text categorisation and hand-written digit recognition.
Since detecting worms is effectively a pattern recognition problem, this
work applies SVMs to detect mutations of known worms. Specifically,
this dissertation investigates the optimal configuration of SVMs and
associated kernel functions to classify worms.
• Comparison of SVMs to other machine learning methods. A
shortcoming of Support Vector Machines is that they do not return a
confidence value with their predictions, often leading to unnecessary
false alarms. Since Gaussian Processes (GPs) [16] automatically return
confidence values with their prediction, this work compares SVMs to
GPs in this particular domain. For further comparison, this disserta-
tion also compares SVMs to K-nearest neighbours [17], known for its
simplicity and solid results in other domains.
• Generating worm mutations for training data. Classifier accu-
racy depends on good quality training data – the more diverse the
training data, the higher the classifier’s accuracy. This work describes
the design and implementation of a worm mutation generator whose
generated mutations can be fed to the machine learning techniques as
training data. This work evaluates whether the quality of the generated
training data is sufficient for machine learning classifiers.
1.2 Thesis statement
Network intrusion detection systems typically detect worms by examining
packet or flow logs for known signatures. This means that worms cannot be
detected until after the signatures are created; in particular it means that
mutations of known worms will remain undetected since they usually have a
different signature.
I assert that it is possible to build an accurate network intrusion detection
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system that automatically detects mutations of known worms using machine
learning techniques. I will prove this assertion by:
1. Characterising the efficacy of different machine learning techniques for
detecting synthetic mutations
2. Applying the most accurate machine learning technique to a wide va-
riety of worm mutations
3. Devising an innovative technique for generating sufficient mutations of
known worms to train the chosen technique
1.3 Contributions
This work contributes to the defence against computer worms and their often
devastating effects in a number of ways:
• Demonstrating the feasibility of machine learning based pattern recog-
nition techniques to detect mutations of known worms
• Comparing how effectively the Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Pro-
cesses, and K-nearest neighbours machine learning techniques detect
worm mutations
• Designing a framework that automatically generates worm mutations
to be used as training data for machine learning classifiers
1.4 Publications
The work reported on in this dissertation has led to the following publication:
O. Sharma, M. Girolami, and J. Sventek, Detecting worm vari-
ants using machine learning, in CoNEXT 07: Proceedings of the
2007 ACM CoNEXT conference, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 112,
ACM, 2007 [18].
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1.5 Outline
The remainder of this work is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 provides background information on worms and network intru-
sion detection, and describes related work by examining existing worms
as well as intrusion detection systems optimised for detecting worms.
Chapter 3 presents an an overview of machine learning, followed by a de-
tailed overview of the three prominent machine learning techniques that
this work investigates: Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes,
and K-nearest neighbours.
Chapter 4 introduces a system that applies machine learning to detect
worm mutations. The chapter describes how network data is trans-
formed into a format that is understood by machine learning tech-
niques, and then proposes how to deploy machine learning techniques
to detect mutations of known worms.
Chapter 5 investigates whether machine learning techniques in general, and
Support Vector Machines in particular, are suited to detect worm mu-
tations. It describes and analyses a set of experiments used to test this
suitability.
Chapter 6 compares the Support Vector Machines’ results from the pre-
vious chapter to two alternative techniques – Gaussian Processes and
K-nearest neighbours – and discusses their relative advantages and dis-
advantages in detecting worm mutations.
Chapter 7 introduces a worm mutation generator to overcome lack of train-
ing data in the real world that threatens to starve machine learning
methods of training data. Specifically it examines whether the gen-
erated mutations offer sufficiently high quality training data for the
machine learning classifiers.
Chapter 8 summarises the suitability of machine learning for automatically
detecting worm mutations, in particular, the relative strengths and
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weaknesses of Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes, and K-
nearest neighbours. It also revisits the effectiveness of the training data
produced by the worm mutation generator.
Chapter 9 explores opportunities for future work. Possible opportunities
include defending against sophisticated worm attack strategies, design-
ing a custom kernel, alternative feature representation, real-time detec-
tion, online training, cascading classifiers, and scaling the infrastructure
Chapter 2
Worms and Intrusion Detection
The previous chapter highlighted the threat posed by worms and their mu-
tations. This chapter now turns to the existing defence mechanisms against
this worm menace. To better understand how worms can be detected, the
first part of this chapter devotes itself to background information on worms
– what kind of damage they cause, how they infect their hosts and how they
spread. The second part scrutinises existing network intrusion detection sys-
tems, focusing on recent systems designed to detect worms.
2.1 Worms
Worms1 [1, 2] are malicious programs that spread themselves to hosts on the
Internet by exploiting vulnerabilities [20, 21] such as buffer overflows [22], in
software applications. They are essentially computer viruses [23] that spread
without the need of human intervention. Although initial worm experiments
had already taken place in the early 1980’s [1], the first Internet worm wasn’t
released until 1988. Named after its author, the Morris worm brought down
hundreds of machines, at that time a significant portion of the Internet.
As the Internet evolved into a global network, worms emerged as a global
security threat. Several worms were released [4] in the decades that followed,
1The name worm originates from the tapeworm programs in the science fiction novel
The Shockwave Rider [19] published in 1975.
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wreaking havoc and causing considerable financial damage.
Even when worms are not designed to damage hosts but simply spread
as fast as possible, they still severely disrupt networks by generating vast
amounts of traffic [24] in similar ways that spam email is clogging the Inter-
net. However, worms usually also carry additional payloads to damage indi-
vidual hosts, rather than just negatively affecting their network connectivity.
This payload allows the worm to execute arbitrary and potentially malicious
code, with past damages ranging from defacing websites to corrupting files all
the way to erasing entire hard disks. The potential for damage is not limited
to software: even physical damage could be caused, for example by forcing
insufficiently cooled machines to overheat with incessant heavy workloads.
2.1.1 Challenges in defending against worms
There are a number of challenges in successfully defending against worm
attacks, including:
• Excessive number of vulnerabilities. Today’s Internet has mil-
lions of hosts, directly accessible through public Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses. Millions more are indirectly accessible behind gateways,
routers and firewalls. Combined with the thousands of software appli-
cations (and often hundreds of different versions of particular software
applications), worms are offered a vast number of potential backdoors
through which to spread.
• Immediate feedback. With today’s high speed Internet connections
and trunks, worm authors have close to immediate feedback on whether
their worm is successful. This enables worm authors to churn out new,
more lethal versions much more quickly than manually maintained net-
work intrusion detection systems can react.
• Ease of access. Coding worms was never easier. Websites provide all
the necessary ingredients to produce a successful worm, from tutorials
and source code, to entire development frameworks [25].
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2.1.2 Worm attack strategies
To defend against a worm intrusion one must understand its strategy and line
of attack. This section details the two stages in a worm’s attack: infection
and proliferation.
2.1.2.1 Infection
How do worms infiltrate their victims in the first place? Worms are just
computer programs, so for them to self-replicate and propagate, they must
be executed with sufficient privileges. If they cannot be executed or do not
have sufficient privileges once executed, they are rendered harmless.
But how can one bring a remote host to execute the worm programs?
Worms exploit low-level software vulnerabilities in services running on the
remote host. These vulnerabilities abound in today’s Internet, not least
thanks to the large number of hosts that run outdated software whose vulner-
abilities have been known for years. Common vulnerabilities include buffer
overflows [22], integer overflows [26], incorrect handling of format strings [27],
and faulty memory management [28, 29].
Vulnerabilities typically share the common trait of causing a computer’s
program counter to jump to the beginning of the worm’s executable payload,
thereby executing the worm program. From then on life is easy for the worm
since it then runs at the same privilege as the vulnerable service in question,
which more often than not means it has administrator (unrestricted) rights.
If not, it is possible to combine the infection vulnerability with a second
vulnerability that elevates the privileges of the worm.
2.1.2.2 Proliferation
Once the worm has successfully infected a vulnerable host, it typically self-
replicates and spreads itself over the network. There are several spreading
strategies it can use, ranging from simply generating a set of random IP
addresses, to more sophisticated spreading strategies such as systematically,
in a co-ordinated fashion, scanning ranges of IP addresses. The in-depth
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discussion of worm spreading strategies in [10] reveals just how rapidly worms
can spread when working in co-ordinated fashion.
As with some biological viruses, the number of hosts infected grows ex-
ponentially initially, until the majority of vulnerabilities have been infected.
In later stages, the growth slows, typically due to network congestion and
human intervention2.
The key defence strategy is to stop worms in their initial stages. Worms
such as Slammer [8] have demonstrated that the time window to line up a
defence is less than 15 minutes, too short for human intervention. The only
way, then, is to automate the detection of the worm and thus halt its spread
in that critical first quarter of an hour.
2.1.3 A brief case study of worms
This section deepens the conceptual understanding of the previous section
with concrete case studies of some of the most infamous worms. The case
studies focus on the worm’s infect-spread attack cycles.
2.1.3.1 Code Red
Code Red [6, 5] exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability in Microsoft’s Inter-
net Information Services (IIS) [7] web server to infect hosts. Once infected,
Code Red generated a set of random IP addresses to which it then tried to
spread. There was a fatal flaw in this worm: it used a static seed to generate
the IP addresses, which meant that all infected hosts generated the same set
of IP addresses. This flaw prevented the worm from spreading far.
Several days after Code Red’s initial appearance, a change in its behaviour
was observed: it began to probe new hosts. The change in behaviour was
due to an updated version of Code Red, identical in all aspects except for the
random number generator, which now used a dynamic random seed. This
mutation enabled it to infect 359, 000 hosts in less than 14 hours [6].
2Interestingly, computer worms spread similarly to human disease; for an approach
that uses a cyberspace equivalent of a Centre for Disease Control to help defend against
Internet worms, see [30]
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2.1.3.2 Slapper
Slapper [31] is a Linux worm that exploits a vulnerability in the OpenSSL [32]
module used by older versions of the Apache web server [33]. It was let loose
into the wild less than two months after the vulnerability in OpenSSL [32]
was disclosed in July 2002.
Although the Slapper worm caused nowhere near as much damage as
Code Red had in the previous year, it raised some interesting points. First,
it showed that Linux is also susceptible to worm infections, dispelling the
common myth of worms being a Windows problem. And second, it was the
first worm to build up a peer-to-peer overlay of infected hosts (known as a
botnet [34]) that enabled them to be remotely controlled for, say, distributed
denial of service attacks [35].
How does Slapper infect its hosts? Slapper is launched with a single
parameter – the target’s IP address. First, it fingerprints this host to check
if it is running a vulnerable version of Apache. It does this by sending an
invalid HTTP GET request to which Apache responds with its version number.
Slapper looks up this version in a hard-coded list, and if present proceeds
with the attack.
Next, Slapper initiates an SSL handshake [36] with the server by sending
a client hello message to OpenSSL. The server responds by sending the
client its certificate. Usually a client would now respond by sending the
server its public key together with the key’s length. But this is where the
vulnerability lies: OpenSSL does not check that the key’s length is within
certain bounds, facilitating a buffer overflow attack.
Slapper fakes its certificate and overstates the key’s length so that when
the server sends back the key it also sends additional data to Slapper. Since,
as the name suggests, OpenSSL is open source, Slapper knows exactly which
variables and data structures are returned as a result of requesting a too
large key. Among other information, OpenSSL returns a reference to a data
structure stored on the heap, which if overwritten allows arbitrary shell code
to be executed.
To overwrite the heap value Slapper overflows the buffer a second time.
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The second overflow only works because Apache’s connections are handled
by a process pool rather than a thread pool. Under normal circumstances
new connection requests are served from the pool, unless all processes are
busy, in which case a new child process is spawned. These child processes
are identical to their parents, including the heap allocations. To force a new
process to be spawned, Slapper exhausts the process pool by rapidly initiating
20 connections. The next request for a new connection is then guaranteed to
be a new child process.
All in all, this makes a total of 23 flows3 that Slapper needs to infect a
host. The actual code run in the exploit loads the worm’s source code from
the client to the server, compiles, and executes it.
Slapper serves as an excellent case study because it is one of the few
worms where the source code is easily available, and as such can be tailored
to the purposes of this work. Old versions of Linux and Apache are also
easier to obtain and install than legacy editions of Windows and the IIS web
server.
2.1.3.3 Slammer
A worm that spread even faster was the Slammer [8] worm, which infected
most of its 75, 000 victims within 10 minutes. Slammer, which was released
in January 2003, exploited a buffer-overflow vulnerability in Microsoft’s SQL
Server, which was reported 6 months earlier in July 2002. This worm was
the first Warhol [9] worm observed in the wild, a name coined from Andy
Warhol’s famous quote that “in the future, everybody will have 15 minutes
of fame” [10], and based on the worm’s ability to spread to most vulnerable
machines within 15 minutes.
Slammer’s strength lies in it’s simplicity: it does nothing more than infil-
trate the host using the above mentioned vulnerability, and then continuously
generates random IP address and spreads itself to those hosts if it finds them
to be vulnerable. Although Slammer does not perform anything malicious
on the host, the sheer volumes of traffic it generated caused large network
3One for the initial probe, 20 to exhaust the pool, and two for the buffer overflows.
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outages [8]. Slammer’s growth initially followed an exponential curve and
was later ironically slowed by the collapse of many networks due to denial of
service caused by Slammer itself.
The entire Slammer worm occupies only 376 bytes and fits in a single
UDP packet. Due to this small size and because it used UDP rather than
TCP, Slammer was often able to slip past heavily congested networks where
legitimate traffic could not. Using UDP also meant that the worms spread
was limited by available bandwidth rather than network latency, as is the
case with TCP-based worms such was Code Red. Another benefit of using
UDP over TCP is that UDP does not require a connection to be set up,
which meant that packets could simply be fired and forgotten, rather than
having to keep track of multiple connections, for example with threads which
are limited in number by the operating system, and drastically increase a
worm’s complexity.
Although Slammer was the first successful Warhol worm, it was not per-
fect. Moore et al [8] suggest that minor changes, such as a better random
IP address generator, could have further improved its spread. Additionally,
Slammer was eventually slowed down by blocking UDP port 1434, the MS
SQL server port; had it used a more popular service port, such as that of
HTTP or DNS, this strategy could have rendered the World Wide Web un-
usable.
2.1.3.4 Witty
A worm that targeted a buffer overflow vulnerability in several Internet Secu-
rity Systems (ISS) products was the Witty worm [37], which began to spread
in March 2004 and infected around 12, 000 hosts. The worm gets it’s name
from the payload it carries, which contains the phrase: insert witty message
here.
The witty worm is interesting due to several distinguishing features. First,
it was the first widely propagating worm that carried a destructive payload.
Second, it had the shortest known interval between disclosure of the vulnera-
bility and release of the worm, spreading only a day after the vulnerability was
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disclosed. And third, it was launched in an organised, highly co-ordinated
manner with numerous ground-zero hosts.
Witty’s attack cycle is fairly straightforward:
1. Seed the random number generator using system time.
2. Send 20, 000 copies of itself to random targets.
3. Select a hard disk at random.
4. If successful overwrite a randomly chosen block on this disk, and start
over with step 1.
5. If unsuccessful, start over with step 2.
This process repeats until either the infected machine is rebooted or crashes,
for example when Witty manages to overwrite a system critical section of
the hard disk.
The Witty worm was observed to have infected 110 hosts within the
first ten seconds and 160 at the end of 30 seconds, indicating that a large
number of initial hosts were seeded with the worm before launching the
first attack wave. Given that the worm began to spread only a day after
the vulnerability was disclosed, it is likely that these initial hosts had been
previously compromised.
Like the Slammer worm, the Witty worm used the UDP protocol and was
therefore bandwidth limited, rather than latency limited as is the case with
TCP worms. Additionally, Witty worm cloaked itself by padding its packets
with arbitrary data varying in size between 796 and 1307 bytes.
2.1.3.5 Blaster
The Blaster4 [38] worm was released into the wild in August 2003, and ex-
ploited a buffer overflow vulnerability in the Distributed Component Object
Model (DCOM) Remote Procedure Call (RPC) [39], a service for communi-
cating with objects distributed across networked hosts, in Microsoft Windows
4The Blaster worm is also referred to as the Lovesan worm because it carries the hidden
message “I just want to say LOV YOU SAN!!”
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XP and Windows 2000. As a side effect, the worm also caused instability in
the RPC service on other Windows versions, including Windows NT, Win-
dows XP 64, and Windows Server 2003.
The worm attacks as follows:
1. It connects to TCP port 135 and overflows the DOM RPC service with
excessive amounts of data.
2. The buffer overflow overwrites a critical memory section and facilitates
shell access on TCP port 4444 with local system access.
3. Via the newly granted shell access, Blaster invokes tftp.exe, an FTP
client to transfer its payload (mblast.exe). Transferring the payload
from the attacking host rather than hard-coded servers makes it more
difficult to detect the worm.
4. Blaster sets an entry in the Windows registry to launch the executable
on the next boot. This keeps Blaster alive on the target host even when
the machine is rebooted.
5. The worm reboots the system to launch the executable payload.
6. The infected host then listens on UDP port 69 for connections from
newly compromised hosts.
Once it has infected its host, Blaster launches attacks on a regular basis. If
the date is between August 15th and December 31st it continuously launches
distributed denial of service attacks against windowsupdate.com. Blaster also
repeats these attacks on the 15th of every month outside the date range. The
attack floods destination port 80 with 50 TCP SYN packets (40 bytes each)
per second.
To spread itself, Blaster first generates a random IP address of the form
A.B.C.0, where A, B, and C are random values between 0 and 254. It then
incrementally scans the entire subnet A.B.C.0 – A.B.C.254 for new victims.
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2.2 Intrusion detection systems
Network intrusion detection systems [11] are specialised intrusion detection
systems [40, 41] that monitor network traffic for security breaches such as
worms. These systems are typically deployed at network gateways, allowing
them to act as filters for all incoming traffic.
Since the machine learning worm detectors proposed in this work are in-
tended to augment or replace existing intrusion detection systems, it makes
sense to look at the common approaches to intrusion detection and better
understand how they work. This will be the task of the first part of this sec-
tion. The second part then presents an overview of popular network intrusion
detection systems, focusing on those features that deal with worms.
2.2.1 Approaches to intrusion detection
There are two common approaches to network intrusion detection: anomaly
detection and misuse detection. In anomaly detection [12], systems are
equipped with a model of normal traffic and detect intrusions by comparing
traffic to this model and looking for abnormalities. A weakness is that the
diversity of network traffic makes it difficult to demarcate normal traffic.
Email relaying and peer-to-peer queries, for example, exhibit worm-like traf-
fic characteristics. Matters are complicated further because abnormal traffic
does not necessarily constitute an intrusion.
In misuse detection [13], on the other hand, systems are equipped with
models of intrusions, known as signatures, which are matched to network traf-
fic. A signature is a fingerprint that can be used to identify intrusions. In its
simplest form, it consists of a string of characters (or bytes), but many cur-
rent intrusion detection systems [42, 43] also support regular expressions [44]
and even behavioural fingerprints [45]. A problem with misuse detection is
that only intrusions whose signatures are known can be detected.
Although there is substantial ongoing research into improving anomaly
detection systems, misuse detection systems have emerged as the de facto
standard for intrusion detection since they are both simple and scalable.
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When it comes to rapidly spreading intrusions such as worms, however, mis-
use detection systems have a serious limitation: generating the signature
itself [14].
Signatures are typically created by security experts who analyse network
and host logs after intrusions have occurred. This involves sifting through
thousands of lines of log files – an error-prone and time-consuming undertak-
ing. Given the ferociousness of today’s worms, by the time a signature has
been handcrafted the worm may have already spread to the far ends of the
Internet.
2.2.2 Case studies of intrusion detection systems
How are the approaches to network intrusion detection from the previous
section applied in practice? This section presents popular network intrusion
detection systems, focusing on their worm detection features.
2.2.2.1 Snort
Snort [43] is a popular open source network intrusion detection system that
belongs to the family of misuse detection systems. Snort works by string
matching observed network traffic to a database of known intrusions. To
be effective, this database must be updated frequently, which is why there
are several mechanisms in place to ensure that new signatures are shared
throughout the Snort community quickly and easily.
Snort first divides the traffic based on destination port number. Then a
rule (or signature) can restrict itself to particular known header values, or dig
deeper and perform content matching on the payload. Since string matching
is a relatively expensive operation, it is important to filter out as much as
possible before resorting to content inspection.
Initially Snort focused only on the inspection of single packets. After
several successful evasions [46], however, Snort was extended to support full
TCP flow reassembly. This enables Snort to perform pattern matching across
packet boundaries, greatly increasing its success rate.
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2.2.2.2 Bro
Bro [42] is another open source network intrusion detection system, although
its approach is more refined than Snort’s since it works at the application
protocol level. However, Bro can handle Snort signatures by means of a
conversion script that is shipped with Bro.
Bro works by first assigning a protocol analyser based on preliminary
information, primarily the protocol number, that it extracts from the first few
bytes of reassembled flows. The protocol analysers themselves then generate
events based on various protocol specific data exchanges. For example, a
hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) analyser generates an event for every
HTTP GET request. These events in turn are parsed by policy scripts that
accompany the protocol analysers. These policy scripts are written in a
dedicated scripting language designed for easy manipulation of the received
events and data.
Bro’s stream assembly and protocol analysis is a heavy-weight process
and as such should only be done on flows where it is absolutely necessary.
To reduce the number of flows it analyses, Bro filters unwanted flows using
primitive packet filtering.
2.2.2.3 Earlybird
Earlybird [14] was one of the first research systems dedicated to fingerprinting
new worms, thereby automating the signature generation process. It does this
by building a histogram of all byte strings in all packets that it observes and
constructs signatures for the most frequent ones. Earlybird’s fundamental
assumption is that since worms try to spread to many hosts in a short period
of time, strings that occur frequently at widely dispersed network locations
must belong to a worm.
Earlybird reduces false alarm rates by comparing the current string with
lists of benign strings that are known to occur both frequently and appear at
widely dispersed network locations. These lists of benign strings are known
as white lists.
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2.2.2.4 Autograph
Autograph [47] takes the same approach as Earlybird by assuming that worms
generate bursts of similar traffic to widely dispersed network locations. It
improves over Earlybird, by (i) using a heuristic filter to narrow down the
traffic it has to inspect, and (ii) observing entire flows rather than just single
packets.
The heuristic filter simply classifies all flows originating from port-scanning
sources as suspicious, based on the observation that many worms scan IP ad-
dress ranges in search of vulnerable hosts. Autograph generates signatures
from the suspicious flow pool by dividing flows into content blocks, and then
applying a greedy algorithm to pick out the most prevalent blocks.
Like Earlybird, Autograph attempts to reduce false alarms with white
lists. The authors suggest a training period to collect information to produce
these white lists.
2.2.2.5 Polygraph
Polygraph [48] is a misuse detection system that generates signatures for
polymorphic worms by extracting string similarities in pools of suspicious
and innocuous flows. Polymorphic worms are worms that mutate themselves
at every hop when spreading throughout the network; the possible resilience
of the work proposed in this dissertation to polymorphic worms is discussed
in Section 5.1.1.3.
Polymorphic worms use a number of mutation strategies, such as cor-
rupting its own signature, and Polygraph suggests different string matching
algorithms, each optimised for a specific strategy. If the mutation strategy is
unknown, they suggest experimenting with each algorithm and selecting the
one that yields the least false alarms.
Polygraph extends Autograph’s framework to fingerprinting polymorphic
worms. The authors argue that continuous byte strings, such as used in sig-
natures for Autograph are not sufficient to describe polymorphic worms. The
underlying assumption is that a polymorphic worm, although it changes its
signature from hop to hop, has at least a small fraction of signature in com-
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mon at each incarnation. In most cases that common fraction is the exploit
code, which Polygraph tries to deduce with string matching algorithms such
as finding the longest common sub-sequence [49].
2.2.2.6 PayL
PayL [50, 51] is an anomaly-based detection system that builds traffic models
based on byte frequency distributions in packets.
In the modelling phase, PayL categorises packets according their desti-
nation port, length, and byte frequency distribution of their payload. It
generates these byte frequency distributions by iterating over the payload
using a sliding window of size one-byte, and storing a histogram of observed
bytes. The average frequency and standard deviation of each byte over all
histograms for packets with the same destination port and length are then
stored as the traffic models.
Likewise, in the classification phase packets are first categorised according
to their destination port, then length, and the distance of the payload’s byte
frequency distribution to the model’s byte frequency distribution. Anomalous
packets are those were this distance is above a certain predefined threshold.
An extension using n subsequent bytes rather than just single byte dis-
tributions was proposed in [51]; this technique, known as n-gram extraction,
is used in this dissertation and covered in detail in Section 4.4.
2.2.2.7 Ensemble of one-class classifiers
Similar to this dissertation, Perdisci et al [52] use Support Vector Machines
to detect intrusions. The fundamental difference is that Perdisci et al [52]
take the anomaly detection approach, while this dissertation takes the mis-
use detection approach. The model of normal traffic is based on PayL’s
n-gram extraction, except that higher n-grams are extracted with 2v-gram
approximation5.
5This technique uses a sliding window size of 2 and approximates greater values of n
by incrementing the window by v steps, when traversing the data.
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Another difference is that Perdisci et al [52] propose an ensemble of one-
class SVMs, while this dissertation proposes binary (two-class) Support Vec-
tor Machines. Furthermore, the one-class SVMs in Perdisci et [52] use only
a single kernel, whereas this work investigates a number of kernels. Kernels
and binary classifiers will be covered in the background section on Support
Vector Machines (Section 3.2).
The final difference is that Perdisci et al [52] investigate a wide range of
n-gram values with 2v-gram approximation. They show that 2v-grams yield
good results, however propose the use of multiple classifiers, each operating
in a different feature space, for optimal results. By contrast this dissertation
investigates only n-gram values in the range 1-3, and will demonstrate in
Section 5.3.3.1 that 2-grams yield solid results. Feature extraction using
n-grams is described in detail Section 4.4.
2.2.2.8 Vigilante
Vigilante [53] is a misuse detection system that, unlike other intrusion de-
tection systems discussed so far, monitors code executed on individual hosts
rather than network traffic flows. Vigilante determines whether a network
connection is malicious by running all instructions in a shielded virtual ma-
chine, where it monitors for illegal memory accesses and buffer overflows.
An advantage of Vigilante is that it can detect rapidly spreading worms
where exploits are unknown without blocking innocuous traffic. Another
advantage is that Vigilante can rapidly contain a worm in its early stages
because it disseminates any intrusion it detects to nearby Vigilante hosts,
effectively building a distributed worm detection system.
On the downside, being a host-based detection system by nature means
that Vigilante (i) has to be installed on each host in the network, (ii) monitor-
ing machine instructions in a virtual environment is computation-intensive,
and (iii) programming bugs such as pointer errors could be wrongly flagged
as intrusions, resulting in a high false alarm rate.
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2.2.2.9 Honeycomb
Honeycomb [54] is a misuse detection system that generates signatures by
observing traffic in honeypots. Honeypots [55] are virtual systems that have
been deployed on hosts that have not been assigned a domain name and
are not publicised in any way. They lure worms, based on the assumption
that any attempted communication with these machines must be malicious
since the only way of obtaining their IP address is through random probing.
Honeycomb generates a signature for incoming traffic by finding the longest
common substring in two network connections.
False alarms are easily generated if legitimate traffic reaches the honey-
pots, for example by attackers who deliberately send benign traffic to these
honeypots.
2.3 Summary
This chapter presented background information and related work on worms
and intrusion detection systems.
Worms are malicious programs that automatically spread themselves to
hosts on the Internet by exploiting vulnerabilities of known services, often
wreaking havoc and caused considerable financial damage. The exemplar
worms covered in this chapter were:
• Code Red, which exploited a vulnerability in Microsoft’s Internet In-
formation Services web server and infected 359, 000 hosts in less than
14 hours.
• Slapper, a Linux worm that exploited a vulnerability in the OpenSSL
module of the Apache web server, and built a peer-to-peer overlay of
infected hosts, allowing them to be remote controlled.
• Slammer, which was the first Warhol worm released into the wild
that spread to 75, 000 victims within 10 minutes using a vulnerability
in Microsoft’s SQL server.
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• Witty exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability in several Internet Se-
curity Systems just a day after the vulnerability was disclosed, and
cloaking its rapid spread by padding itself with arbitrary data.
• Blaster targeted Windows’ DCOM RPC with a buffer overflow, down-
loading its payload with an FTP call-back, and registering itself with
the Windows Registry to survive reboots.
Intrusion detection systems are special purpose monitoring systems that
attempt to detect intrusions such as worms. Generally. there are two ap-
proaches to network intrusion detection: anomaly detection, which builds
models of normal traffic and flags all traffic that does not conform to this
model, and misuse detection, which scans for signatures of known intrusions.
Exemplar intrusion detection systems covered in this chapter include:
• Snort and Bro, two widely used open source misuse detection sys-
tems. Snort matches network packets to rules with string matching,
while Bro works with protocol specifics (such as HTTP GET requests).
All rules must be handcrafted.
• Earlybird, Autograph, and Polygraph, three intrusion detection
systems that automatically generate signatures by using string algo-
rithms, such as finding the longest common subsequence, to differenti-
ate between pools of benign and malicious flows.
• PayL and One-Class, two anomaly detectors that use byte frequency
distributions to model the traffic.
• Vigilante, a host-based intrusion detection system that runs instru-
mented software in a shielded environment that monitors for malicious
code such as illegal memory accesses and buffer overflows.
• Honeycomb, an intrusion detection system that generates signatures
by observing traffic in virtual systems that have been deployed on decoy
hosts that have not been assigned a domain name and are not publicised
in any way.
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The following chapter presents background information of Machine Learn-
ing in general, and three techniques (Support Vector Machines, Gaussian
Processes, and K-nearest neighbours) in particular. Chapter 4 then combines
the background of this and the next chapter to present a network intrusion
detection system that uses machine learning to automatically detect worm
mutations.
Chapter 3
Machine learning
This chapter presents background information on Machine Learning, specif-
ically three prominent supervised learning methods: Support Vector Ma-
chines [15], Gaussian Processes [16], and K-nearest neighbors [17].
3.1 Introduction
Machine learning [56, 57, 58] is a sub-discipline of artificial intelligence that
involves developing algorithms to automatically recognise patterns using sta-
tistical classification. Examples of patterns it can recognise include finger-
prints, images, handwriting, voice recordings, and, as this dissertation will
show, worms.
Formally, in statistical classification [57] a pattern is represented by d
features occupying a point in a d-dimensional space (the feature space). The
d-dimensional vector defining a particular pattern is called the pattern vector.
Consider the pattern recognition problem of classifying a person as male or
female given only statistical facts about that person. A possible feature
set consists of the height, weight, and age. The feature space would be 3-
dimensional, and a 36 year old person weighing 72kg and measuring 1.80m
would occupy the pattern vector < 36, 72, 180 > in that feature space.
The aim of machine learning is to select features so that pattern vectors
belonging to different categories (such as male and female) can be partitioned
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into disjoint regions within the feature space. Seen from a different angle, the
effectiveness of a feature set is determined by how well it partitions pattern
vectors into different regions.
3.1.1 Why machine learning?
What makes machine learning attractive for worm detection? The answer is
that machine learning offers a number of key advantages over rival pattern
recognition methods.
One of the simplest such rival methods is template matching (for ex-
ample [59]), where the pattern to be recognised is matched against stored
prototypes (templates), taking into account possible mild alterations such as
rotation or scaling. Simple template matching is computationally demanding
and fails to recognise distortions to the pattern such as a change of viewpoint.
Most of all, template matching depends on the availability of templates to
match against, whereas machine learning techniques are able to learn these
patterns from training data.
Another rival pattern recognition method is the syntactic approach [57].
The underlying idea is that a pattern is composed of smaller sub-patterns that
are themselves composed of sub-patterns, and so on, down to the simplest
sub-patterns called primitives. The pattern can then be seen as a sentence
in a language where the primitives are the alphabet. A language syntax
– consisting of the alphabet and a set of grammatical rules – governs how
complex patterns can be created. Although intuitive, the challenges posed
by the syntactic approach is how to subdivide patterns in the first place,
especially when noise is introduced (as is often the case in network flows
carrying worms). Another drawback is the heavy computation required to
perform the subdivisions.
3.1.2 Supervised vs. unsupervised learning
In machine learning the learning stage can be either supervised or unsuper-
vised. In supervised learning the learning stage is told what class a training
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data item belongs to, for example that pattern < 36, 72, 180 > belongs to
the male class. In unsupervised learning only the pattern vectors but not the
class they belong to are fed to the learning stage, leaving it to the learning
stage to cluster the pattern vectors.
Another way of looking at the difference between supervised and unsu-
pervised learning is that in supervised learning the training data is already
grouped into regions before it enters the learning stage, and the goal is to
classify unknown pattern vectors based on their proximity to a particular
group. In unsupervised learning, on the other hand, the learning stage must
first discover groups of similar pattern vectors in the input data.
This dissertation will use supervised learning because of the similarity
between worm traffic and normal traffic [60].
3.1.3 Parametric vs. non-parametric methods
Besides supervised and unsupervised learning, machine learning techniques
can be either parametric or non-parametric. A parametric model is a data
set that can be described by a finite number of parameters, for example
a normally distributed data set can be defined by its mean and standard
deviation. A parametric method estimates the parameters of a model; this
learned model is then used for classification or regression.
Parametric methods are appealing: once the parameters are learned the
computations are highly efficient because they operate on the model param-
eters and not on the data items in that model. But parametric methods
have two severe drawbacks. First a bad model (caused by over-fitting or
insufficient data) could lead to gross errors in classification or regression.
And second, many real world problems (such as worm detection) cannot be
modelled accurately with a set of parameters.
Because of the risks posed by parametric models, this dissertation devotes
itself exclusively to non-parametric methods. Non-parametric methods have
the additional advantage that they require no prior knowledge about the
distribution and any inference can thus be made directly from the training
data. In other words, non-parametric models offer greater flexibility since
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they require only a similarity measure to be defined between objects.
3.2 Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines [61, 15, 62, 63] is a supervised learning method for
automatic pattern recognition. It emerged in the mid 1990s from a combi-
nation of two independent research streams:
• Advances in Computation Learning Theory, a mathematical discipline
that analyses machine learning algorithms, and
• Development of kernel functions [64, 65] that efficiently transform non-
linearly separable data into linearly separable data
Combining the two streams resulted in a machine learning method that uses
an optimisation algorithm rather than a time-consuming greedy search.
Since their inception, Support Vector Machines have been successfully
applied to solve a large number of real-world pattern recognition problems
including text categorisation [66], image classification [67], and hand-written
character recognition [15].
Support Vector Machines can be used for classification and regression.
Regression finds the curves of best fit for a given data set, while classification
categorises a given data set into two or more classes. This work is interested
in classification only, specifically in classifying network flows as malicious
(carrying a worm) or benign. For this reason the remainder of this section
will discuss Support Vector Machines in the context of classification only; for
information on regression, see [68].
The rest of this section is organised as follows. First comes an overview
of how Support Vector Machines work. This overview will provide an intro-
duction to Support Vector Machines in a systems context, with emphasis on
detecting worm mutations; interested readers can find the underlying math-
ematics in Appendix A1. This section then provides an example application
1For a formal treatment of Support Vector Machines, see also [63]
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Figure 3.1: Classification involves dividing the training data by
a separating hyperplane. In 2-dimensional space as in the above
figure the hyperplane is a line.
of Support Vector Machines. The final parts of this section are devoted to
kernels, which are needed to classify more complex data sets.
3.2.1 How Support Vector Machines work
Classification in general is achieved by dividing the training data into disjoint
groups. If the data is linearly separable, then in 2-dimensional space these
disjoint groups can be pictured as being separated by a dividing line, as
shown in Figure 3.1. More generally for higher dimensions the data will
be separated by a hyperplane, sometimes also called the decision surface.
Equipped with the hyperplane, the classifier can then label a given test data
point based on its position relative to the hyperplane.
For a given data set there may be more than one separating hyperplane,
as depicted in Figure 3.2, and individual classification techniques can be dis-
tinguished by which hyperplane they choose. In particular, the crucial dif-
ference between Support Vector Machines and other classification techniques
such as perceptrons [69] is that Support Vector Machines find the optimal
separating hyperplane by maximising the margin between the hyperplane
and a subset of training data points called the support vectors, pictured in
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Figure 3.2: There may be more than one separating hyperplane for
a given data set; x will be classified depending on which separating
hyperplane is used.
Figure 3.3. Support vectors are the key data points close to the hyperplane
that, if removed, would change the location of the hyperplane.
3.2.2 An example
As an example of how Support Vector Machines classify data, consider again
determining a person’s gender given only a set of statistical data about that
person. To make matters a bit simpler than in the earlier example, assume
that the features height and weight are enough to determine a person’s gen-
der.
Finding the hyperplane can be visualised as plotting the given heights
and weights in a two dimensional co-ordinate system and drawing a line (the
separating hyperplane) that divides the points into regions male and female.
While there are many possible separating lines, the optimal hyperplane would
be the one which maximises the distance between training points of the male
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(a) Removing a support vector affects the position of the hyperplane.
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(b) Removing a vector that is not a support vector, does not affect the postion of the
hyperplane.
Figure 3.3: Support Vector Machines find the optimal separating
hyperplane by maximising the margin between the hyperplane and
a subset of the training data points called the support vectors. By
definition, removing a support vector moves the location of the
hyperplane.
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Figure 3.4: The optimal hyperplane maximises the distance from
any training point.
and female classes, as shown in Figure 3.4.
3.2.3 Non-linearly separable data and the kernel trick
As mentioned earlier in this section, given a set of pattern vectors and their
classification, Support Vector Machines determine the maximum margin sep-
arating hyperplane. Unfortunately, this is not always that straightforward –
it is often the case that data is simply not linearly separable. This is where
the so-called kernel trick [61] comes to the rescue.
A kernel is defined as a measure of similarity between two pattern vectors.
Conceptually, kernels equip Support Vector Machines with the ability to map
non-linearly separable data points into a different dimension where they are
linearly separable. Consider as an example the data points in Figure 3.5:
the data set on the left is not linearly separable, yet looking at the data, it
is easy to picture an elliptical boundary that distinguishes between the two
classes. The trick, then, is to map the data points into a dimension where
they are linearly separable, as shown in the right diagram.
Mapping data points to a higher dimension is seemingly costly. More di-
mensions would mean larger vectors, which in turn would mean larger mem-
ory requirements and longer calculation times. Thanks to kernels, however,
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Figure 3.5: Support vector machines deal with linearly inseparable
data by implicitly mapping it to a dimension where it is separable.
SVMs do not need to store these high dimensional vectors explicitly. Ker-
nels are a means of implicitly defining a feature space via the inner product
in that space. In other words, kernels encapsulate the mapping into higher
dimensions and the similarity calculations in that dimension without having
to store the mapped data points [63].
Since the kernel handles the critical job of finding a way to separate
– and thus classify – the data, it is the key parameter in a Support Vector
Machine. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet choice of kernel: each kernel
has its advantages and disadvantages for the data in question. For this
reason, one of the aims of this work is to find the optimal kernel configuration
for Support Vector Machines to detect worms. To this end, the following
candidate kernels have been examined:
• Linear kernel [15]. This is the standard SVM kernel that tries to
find a dividing hyperplane by calculating the dot product on pattern
vectors in the original feature space (no mapping to a higher dimension
is performed). Being the standard kernel and operating in the input
feature space renders it a simple kernel as a basis for comparison.
• Radial basis function kernel (RBF) [15]. This kernel applies a
CHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 35
Gaussian function to the pattern vectors, implicitly taking them to a
higher (infinite) space. Being a radial basis function it operates solely
on the length of the patterns and not the direction or position. The
RBF kernel has become popular thanks to its good performance in a
wide range of applications [66, 70].
• String kernel [71]. Originally developed for categorising text docu-
ments [71] such as spam email, the string kernel maps the input strings
into the feature space generated by all sub-strings of a given length,
to which it then applies the inner product. Since a network flow is a
stream of bit strings the string kernel offers itself as a strong candi-
date [72].
Of the above kernels, the RBF kernel is often suggested as a reasonable
first choice [73] because of its solid general-purpose performance, and unlike
the linear kernel it can deal with non-linearly separable data by implicitly
mapping the input feature space into a higher dimension. This dissertation
investigates in Chapter 5 whether this holds true for worm detection. Addi-
tionally, it has been shown that the linear kernel is a special case of the RBF
kernel [74] – intuitively a very wide and short Gaussian distribution can be
thought of as linear.
What about other kernels such as the polynomial and sigmoid kernels? A
disadvantage of the polynomial kernel [15] is that it has more hyperparame-
ters than the RBF kernel, making the search for an optimal combination more
time consuming. Additionally, the RBF kernel has less numerical difficulties,
while the sigmoid kernel has been shown invalid for certain parameters [75].
3.2.4 Support Vector Machines revisited
Figure 3.6 summarises the Support Vector Machines cycle discussed so far,
consisting of a learner and classifier stage. The learner is supplied with
labelled training data, from which it derives the Support Vectors with the
help of the kernel. Depending on the kernel, this will be in the input feature
space (as is the case for linear kernels) or in a richer feature space (as is the
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Figure 3.6: Support Vector Machines cycle. Training data
is fed into the learner, which then builds a model that allows the
classifier to classify unknown test data.
case with RBF or string kernels). Equipped with the support vectors, the
classifier can then classify test data by calculating the closeness of the test
data to each support vector, again using the kernel.
3.3 Gaussian Processes
An alternative machine learning technique that has proven its worth in clas-
sification is Gaussian Processes [16, 76, 77]. Like Support Vector Machines,
Gaussian Processes are a supervised learning method in which the classi-
fier is first trained with labelled training data from which it then infers its
predictions.
Unlike Support Vector Machines, which divide the training data into dis-
joint groups with a hyperplane and then classify test data based on its posi-
tion relative to the hyperplane, Gaussian Processes derive a function that fits
the training data and accurately predicts the classification for an unknown
test data point. More formally, given a training data set of N observations
(x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xn, yn) where each xi is an input pattern vector and yi
its corresponding output, Gaussian Processes find a function f(x) such that
CHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 37
f(xn) = yn ∀(xn, yn) ∈ N and that predictions can be made for unknown
values of x.
As with Support Vector Machines, there is an important distinction be-
tween regression and classification: if the function f(x) is continuous then
it can be used for data regression, while if f(x) is discrete it can serve for
data classification. Contrary to Support Vector Machines, however, where
regression and classification can be treated in separate discussions, the two
are inextricably linked in Gaussian Processes. In particular, classification in
Gaussian Processes involves first finding a regression (continuous) function
f(x) before applying a response function [16] that returns a discrete value
for classification.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. The first part
argues the case for Gaussian Processes as a potentially attractive alternative
to Support Vector Machines, particularly for worm detection. This part also
outlines how Gaussian Processes fit into the this dissertation. The next part
explains how Gaussian Processes work; as with Support Vector Machines this
explanation will be from a systems design perspective. The final parts of this
section describe how squashing functions facilitate classification, and how
kernels (like their SVM counterparts) allow Gaussian Processes to handle
complex data sets.
3.3.1 Why Gaussian Processes?
What makes Gaussian Processes an attractive machine learning technique
compared to Support Vector Machines? A shortcoming of Support Vector
Machines is that they only return a classification, but no indication of how
confident they are that this classification is correct. Gaussian Processes, on
the other hand, automatically return confidence values as part of their result.
Confidence values add another angle to the classification that can help
reduce false alarm rates. Equipped with the confidence value, the classifier
can make a more informed decision, for example by accepting a proposed
classification only if the confidence value is above a certain threshold while
flagging it for further inspection otherwise.
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It should be noted that workarounds for calculating a confidence measure
in Support Vector Machines have been proposed, for example [78]. But due
to the ad hoc nature of these methods and unlike Gaussian Processes they
do not cater for the predictive variance in the regression function.
3.3.2 How Gaussian Processes work
As mentioned at the outset of this section, Gaussian Processes map the input
training data to a function f that can make predictions for all possible input
values. But given a set of training data there is a potentially infinite number
of functions that fit the training data points, so which function will yield the
most accurate predictions for unknown data values?
Conceptually, the basic idea [76] is to first narrow down the set of possible
functions to those more likely to fit the data at hand, for example because
they are smoother. This filtering occurs before any training data is seen
and the resulting function set is called the prior distribution; a sample is
pictured in Figure 3.7(a). The next step is to overlay the training data
points onto the prior as shown in Figure 3.7(b). Discarding the functions
that do not pass through all the training data points yields the posterior
shown in Figure 3.7(c).
In the posterior shown in Figure 3.7(c), the solid line is the mean of
the remaining (not-discarded) functions – this is the regression function f .
The shaded area stretches twice the standard deviation of a given x value
and denotes the confidence value at that x – the larger the area the lower
the confidence. The confidence around the training data items is high, as
expected.
An issue side-stepped in the above explanation is that the prior and pos-
terior distributions consist of an infinite set of (Gaussian) distributions, but
to be practically feasible the calculations must be performed in finite time.
Loosely speaking, the key concept is to group the infinite set of distributions
so that they can be treated as one entity and defined with a finite set of
properties. Applying this concept, a Gaussian distribution is a distribution
defined by its mean and standard deviation. A Gaussian process, still loosely
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Figure 3.7: The prior (a) is a pre-selected set of functions likely to
fit the task at hand. Overlaying the prior with training data points
(b), and discarding those functions that do not pass through all
training data points yields the posterior (c).
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speaking, can be thought of as a group of (possibly infinite) Gaussian distri-
butions, and that group can be defined by the mean and standard deviation
of all the distributions.
Seen from a slightly more formal angle, a Gaussian distribution can be
viewed as a function f(x) that operates on scalar values2 x, while a Gaussian
process operates on a set of i Gaussian distributions fi(x). The mean value
of the Gaussian distribution is that of evaluating f(x) for all x; the mean
value of the Gaussian process is that of evaluating all fi(x) for all x.
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Figure 3.8: Gaussian Processes can be seen as filling a long vector
where the entries hold the mean common to all Gaussian distribu-
tions in the process.
How does this help with the challenge of computing with infinite prior
and posterior distribution sets in finite time? Another way to look at a
function f(x) is as a very long vector, where the indices consists of the x
values and the entries for each index x are the corresponding f(x). Figure 3.8
extends this idea to Gaussian processes: the functions f1 − f3 are random
samples from the prior distribution. The crosses mark the training data
points {(1, 5), (3, 8), (6, 7)}, with corresponding entries in the function vector.
2Or more generally, vector values for multivariate distributions
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From a Gaussian process perspective, the vector entries can be seen as
buckets to be filled with Gaussian distributions where the mean is 5 when
x = 1, 8 when x = 3, and 7 when x = 6. The distributions common in all
buckets (shaded grey) are the posterior distributions; in Figure 3.8, only f1
and f2 meet that requirement.
Gaussian processes, then, effectively work backwards in computing the
posterior distributions by viewing the training data as the mean values com-
mon to all distributions in the posterior.
3.3.3 From regression to classification
The previous section explained how Gaussian processes, given a training data
set, derive a function that allows predictions of unknown test data. But there
is still a missing piece to the puzzle: the output of the regression stage is a
continuous function, which can lie in the range −∞ to ∞, and is therefore
unsuitable for classification.
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Figure 3.9: The classification function g(x) is obtained by squash-
ing y(x) through the response function σ
The approach taken by Gaussian processes is to apply a response func-
tion [76]. The underlying idea is that classes are assigned numeric labels,
for example benign=0 and malicious=1, and the response function squashes
the regression from −∞ to ∞ to fit into the range [0, 1] (Figure 3.9). The
squashed result can then be used for classification.
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3.3.4 Kernel functions
Like Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes belong to the set of kernel
machines, with the kernel determining the similarity or closeness between
two data points. In the Gaussian Processes literature, kernels are commonly
referred to as covariance functions, but for consistency this dissertation will
continue to refer to them as kernel functions. The kernel heavily influences
the smoothness of the prior distributions, and as such it is a key ingredient
to the classifier.
The approach taken in this dissertation is to find the optimal kernel for
Support Vector Machines, and to use this kernel for comparison in Gaussian
Processes. The underlying rationale is that since a kernel measures similarity
between data points, for a given data type (such as network traffic) the kernel
should work equally under Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes.
For a rigourous treatment of kernel functions in Gaussian Processes, including
the conditions a function must fulfil to be considered a kernel, see [76].
3.4 K-nearest neighbours
K-nearest neighbours [17] is one of the simplest pattern recognition algo-
rithms that nonetheless often performs well. To classify an unknown test
data point, the K-nearest neighbour algorithm compares that test data point
to all given training data points and performs a majority vote on the classes
of the K nearest neighbours (Figure 3.10). The test data point is classified
under the class of the winner of that vote.
In contrast to Gaussian Processes, K-nearest neighbours is a classification
algorithm by nature. Although K-nearest neighbours is a supervised learning
method, unlike Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes it defers
all calculations until classification.
The naive implementation of the algorithm iterates over all training data
points and calculates the distance to the test data, orders the training data
points by that distance, and then casts a majority vote on the top K training
data points. While easily implemented, this implementation suffers from
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Figure 3.10: The K-nearest neighbour algorithm makes its pre-
diction by finding the K points that are closest to the point in
question (the star). It then takes a majority vote of the classes
of these K points to determine the prediction for the point in
question.
limited scalability as it grows linearly with the number of training data points.
For this reason a number of optimisations have been proposed, for example
partitioning the feature space [79].
Critical to the predication accuracy is the number of neighbours (K ).
The optimal value for K depends on the type of data, although in general
increasing K should raise the accuracy by mitigating the negative impact of
noise on the classification accuracy. On the downside, increasing K blurs the
boundaries between the classes. A common method for choosing K is cross-
validation, whereby the training data is split into an actual training data set
with the remaining data items used to validate the results. Note that for
K= 1 the algorithm degenerates to simply finding the nearest neighbour.
The K-nearest neighbour works for any types of data points, as long as a
function is available that returns the distance between two data points (for
some definition of distance). The standard distance function is the Euclidean
distance function, which also works well for multi-dimensional data points.
In this dissertation K-nearest neighbours serves two purposes. The first
is to determine whether a simple algorithm such as K-nearest neighbours can
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be applied to a complex pattern recognition problem such as detecting worm
mutations. And the second is to see how K-nearest neighbours compares to
the (more complex) machine learning techniques of Support Vector Machines
and Gaussian Process in detecting worm mutations.
3.4.1 Properties
K-nearest neighbours offers both positive and negative properties:
• Simplicity. Both from a conceptual and implementation point of view
the simplicity of K-nearest neighbours makes it an attractive machine
learning method.
• Incremental learning. A nice side effect of delaying calculations to
classification time is that K-nearest neighbours algorithm can learn
incrementally as new training data becomes available. Thus, unlike
Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes, it does not need to
be retrained with the entire (original plus new) training data set.
• Training data percentage sensitivity. A drawback is that classes
with a higher percentage of training data tend to dominate the predic-
tion simply by their larger presence. The dominance could be reduced
by taking into account the distances during the majority vote.
• Noise sensitivity. Another drawback is that the accuracy of K-
nearest neighbours can be severely affected by noise or other irrelevant
features, leading to over-fitting. As mentioned in the previous section
this can be counterbalanced by increasing the number of neighbours
(K ), but this has the negative effect of blurring the class boundaries.
3.5 Other machine learning techniques
What about other machine learning techniques? This section discusses some
of the other popular machine learning techniques used for classification, and
explains why this dissertation decided not to apply them to worm detection.
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Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) such as Fisher’s discriminant analy-
sis [80], tries to find a linear combination of features that separate two or more
classes. LDA projects the feature vectors down to a single dimension with a
linear discriminant function in order to classify the data. This dissertation
does not consider LDA because of known difficulties with non-linear data
(such as network traffic), and because it has been shown to be outperformed
by Support Vector Machines on standard benchmarks [81].
Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA) is a generalisation of LDA that
dissects classes with a quadric surface, with the advantage that it does
not rely on the assumption that the covariance of all classes are identical.
Quadratic Discriminant Analysis has been shown to be outperformed by Sup-
port Vector Machines, for example in [82].
Decision tree learning [83] builds a decision tree from data by repeatedly
partitioning the input space until a node consists only of a single class. The
branches are conjunctions that lead to the classes, and classification involves
moving down the branches until hitting a leaf node. Although decision trees
are effective and efficient for small data sets, they do not scale well for large
data sets, winding up in complicated trees that consume large amounts of
memory. Since this dissertation expects to deal with large volumes of network
traffic data, decision trees were not further considered.
Another popular alternative classification technique is offered by Artificial
Neural Networks [84]. However, in recent years Gaussian Processes and Sup-
port Vector Machines have repeatedly been shown to outperform Artificial
Neural Networks [77, 85], one of the reasons being that they are less prone
to overfitting. Another reason is that Artificial Neural Networks are a para-
metric method, and as mentioned in Section 3.1.3, this dissertation favours
non-parametric models because of their flexibility in that only a similarity
measure between objects need to be defined.
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3.6 Summary
Machine learning is a sub-discipline of artificial intelligence that involves
developing algorithms that automatically recognise patterns using statistical
classification. Examples of patterns to be recognised include fingerprints,
images, handwriting, voice recordings, or as in this dissertation, worms.
This work focuses on three prominent supervised learning methods:
• Support Vector Machines learn patterns by dividing labelled train-
ing data into disjoint groups and finding the separating hyperplane that
maximises the margin between the hyperplane and the support vectors.
Equipped with the hyperplane, the classifier can then label a given test
data point based on its position relative to the hyperplane.
• Gaussian Processes learn patterns by mapping the input training
data to a function that can make predictions for all possible input
values. The basic idea is to first narrow down the set of possible func-
tions to those more likely to fit the data at hand, and then overlaying
the training data points and discarding the functions that do not pass
through all training data points. Gaussian Processes are an attractive
machine learning technique since, unlike Support Vector Machines, they
return a confidence value as part of their classifications.
• K-nearest neighbours is one of the simplest pattern recognition algo-
rithms that surprisingly often performs well. The K-nearest neighbour
algorithm classifies an unknown test data point by calculating the dis-
tance of this point to all given training data points and performing a
majority vote on the K nearest neighbours’ classes.
The following chapter ties together this chapter and the previous chapter
by showing how machine learning can be applied to worm detection.
Chapter 4
Applying machine learning to
worm detection
The last two chapters looked at intrusion detection systems and machine
learning as separate, standalone subjects. This chapter merges these two
subjects by presenting the design of an intrusion detection system that de-
tects worm mutations using machine learning.
The questions this chapter answers: (i) how to capture network traffic
accurately, (ii) how to convert the captured traffic to a format understood
by the machine learning classifier, (iii) where the machine learning modules
fit into the system, and (iv) where and how such a system can be deployed.
Before answering these questions, this chapter first defines a suitable
worm model that will serve as a basis for this dissertation.
4.1 Worm model
For the purposes of this dissertation, a worm can be thought of as a stream of
binary data that consists of the following three parts, illustrated in Figure 4.1:
1. Application specific data consisting of protocol headers and other
control information required to communicate with the vulnerable ser-
vice.
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Figure 4.1: The worm model used throughout this dissertation
consists of (i) application specific data required to communicate
with the vulnerable service, (ii) exploit code that attacks the vul-
nerability and injects the malicious code, and (iii) the executable
payload which is executed upon successful infiltration of the target.
2. Exploit code that attacks the service by exploiting a vulnerability,
and that injects the malicious code into the application.
3. Executable payload that runs upon successful infiltration of the sys-
tem by the exploit code; typically, this executable contains potentially
malicious actions and necessary information on how to spread further.
With this model in mind, how can one differentiate between two different
types of worms (for example Code Red vs. Slapper) and worm mutations
(such as Code Red version 1 and 1.1)?
This dissertation defines a worm mutation as a worm that carries the
same exploit but a different executable payload – that is, mutations of a worm
exploit the same vulnerability but execute a different payload on successful
infiltration. Figure 4.2 illustrates this difference: the bottom of the figure
shows that a worm that is identical to another in every aspect except the
exploit code is considered a different worm; on the other hand, worms, that
share the same exploit like those in the centre of the figure, no matter how
much they differ otherwise, are considered to be mutations of each other.
This definition of worm mutations is based on the understanding that
worm authors tend to refine either the damage that their worms cause, or
how the worms spread – both refinements that will alter the executable pay-
load. For example, Code Red 1.1 refined the executable payload of Code
Red 1 to find more potential victims by improving the random IP address
generator. The application specific data, while constant, will be similar to
application specific data of legitimate software communicating with the vul-
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Figure 4.2: This dissertation distinguishes between mutations of
the same worm and different worms by their exploit code. Worm
mutations share the same exploit code, while different types of
worm do not.
nerable service. This leaves the exploit code as (a) the most likely lowest
common denominator between worm mutations, and (b) the distinguishing
factor to legitimate traffic.
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, intrusion detection systems typically iden-
tify worms by their signature, which can be thought of as a character string
or a regular expression, that is present in all mutations of the worm and not
in benign flows, and as such uniquely identifies the worm. The signatures in
existing intrusion detection systems typically only match part of the exploit
(if at all), plus additional code outside the exploit that matches the worm.
As such, these conventional signatures will usually not detect mutations.
Note that since this model treats worms as byte streams, the definition
of a worm mutation is a binary equivalence one. The model does not cater
for the possibility of changing the exploit code’s binary while keeping the
underlying semantics unchanged, for example by modifying the machine code
to use different registers or inserting NOOP instructions.
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Figure 4.3: High level architecture of the machine learning enabled
worm detector.
4.2 Architecture
Figure 4.3 presents a high-level architecture of a machine learning enabled
worm detector, consisting of three stages: capturing traffic, converting the
traffic into a format that is readable by machine learning techniques, and
classifying the flows as malicious or benign.
The rest of this chapter discusses each of these components in turn, and
then revisits the architecture with the information from these discussions.
4.3 Capturing network traffic
There are various levels at which the network traffic can be analysed, for
example, at the packet level by examining each packet individually. A dis-
advantage of examining traffic at this level is that malicious contents such as
worm exploits can easily be split up over several packets. Even when worm
authors themselves do not split their worms, if a large packet traverses a
network with a small maximum transmission size, the packet will be split
into smaller packets by routers along the way. Moreover, one of the routers
may experience congestion, causing the packets to arrive out of order. Thus
scanning at packet level is too fine-grained and will potentially miss worms
spanning multiple packets.
At the other end of the analysis spectrum is application protocol-level
analysis, as is done by Bro [42], discussed in Section 2.2.2.2. Protocol level
analysers generate events based on various protocol specific data exchanges.
For example, a hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) analyser could generate
an event for every HTTP GET request. The events in turn are parsed by policy
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scripts that accompany the protocol analysers.
An advantage of application protocol-level analysis is the high abstraction
level it offers, allowing decisions to be made with greater certainty. Two
problems with application protocol-level analysis are that (i) they are heavy-
weight in terms of processing due to the overhead of parsing byte streams into
state machines of those protocols, and (ii) to make the most of this setup,
protocol-level analysers for all protocols would have to be written.
A third alternative is to analyse the network at the flow level. Flows are
typically defined as transmission control protocol (TCP) [86] or user data-
gram protocol (UDP) [87] packet streams, where a stream is identified by the
source Internet Protocol (IP) address, source port number, the destination IP
address, and the destination port number. In addition, TCP packets include
a sequence number that determines the order in which these packets are to
be reassembled, as the TCP protocol allows packets to arrive in arbitrary
order to handle the above mentioned queuing delays at routers.
Analysing flows rather than the individual packets that make up a flow
ensures that worms can be scanned in their entirety. Flows can then be
treated as byte arrays for pattern recognition. Because flow-level analysis
is flexible and fine-grained enough to allow worms to be scanned in their
entirety without incurring the overhead of parsing protocols, the machine
learning worm detector will work exclusively at the flow level. The impact
of flow-level analysis on real-time reassembly of these flows on high speed
networks is discussed in Section 9.4 as future work.
4.3.1 A sample implementation
To help understand how flows can be reassembled and scanned for signatures
concurrently, this section briefly discusses an implementation of a lightweight
packet capture and flow reassembly system.
The system consists of three main components: a packet capturer, a flow
table, and a flow analyser. The packet capturer simply takes one packet
from the wire at a time, using the the pcap [88] packet capturing library,
and adds it to the flow table, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. The flow table is
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Figure 4.4: Individual packets are sorted into flows as they arrive
on the wire.
a data structure that holds packets sorted by flow. The flow analyser runs
in its own thread, stepping through the flow table sequentially looking for
suspicious flows. In this multi-threaded architecture the flow analyser works
concurrently to the packet capturer1.
The flow analyser encapsulates the logic that labels flows malicious or
benign – this is where the machine learning algorithm sits, which could be
modularised to allow for multiple worm detectors. The flow table is imple-
mented as a hashtable to achieve lookup and insertion in constant time. The
hashtable’s key is the 5-tuple <source IP address, destination IP address,
source port, destination port, protocol> that uniquely describes a flow.
The flow data structure consists of two packet buffers and a read-write
lock, as illustrated in Figure 4.5. The packets are added to the working
buffer until the flow analyser arrives to inspect that flow. At this point,
the read-write lock is set and from that point any incoming packets land in
the holding buffer. When the flow analyser completes, the lock is released
1Note that conventional threads such as pthreads [89], are not well suited for high-rate
packet capturing, for reasons outlined in [90], which suggests Protothreads [91] as a viable
alternative.
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Figure 4.5: A flow consists of two packet buffers and a read-write
lock. Maintaining a holding buffer for when the flow analyser
examines the flow prevents packets from being discarded.
and the packets moved from the holding buffer to the working buffer. This
structure allows packets to be examined without having to block the entire
flow or dropping packets.
4.4 Feature extraction
As discussed in Section 3.1, machine learning techniques perform statistical
analysis on input data that can be captured in feature (or pattern) vectors.
A feature vector is a row of data where each column represents a specific
character in a fixed alphabet. Often, however, data such as images, text, or
as in this work, network flows, cannot readily be captured as feature vectors,
and features must be extracted explicitly. The remainder of this first section
explains in greater detail why features must be extracted from network flows
and then exactly how features are extracted.
4.4.1 Why features must be extracted
To better understand why features must be extracted, consider a case insen-
sitive feature vector that represents words by using 26 columns, one for each
letter in the alphabet. The value held in each column denotes the presence
(1) or absence (0) of that letter in the word. The word ELVIS, for example,
would then be represented by the feature vector shown in Figure 4.6(a).
A shortcoming of this simple representation is that any permutation of the
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Figure 4.6: Feature vectors representing the words ELVIS and
LIVES using uni-grams, and bi-grams.
word ELVIS would produce the same feature vector; for instance, LIVES and
LEVIS both collide as feature vectors with ELVIS. To overcome this problem,
one can use a feature vector that represents all possible combinations of two
characters, from AA to ZZ. Figures 4.6(b) and 4.6(c) show that the feature
vectors for ELVIS and LIVES are now different. Feature vectors with one
character per entry are called uni-grams, those with two characters are called
bi-grams, and the generalisation to n characters per entry are called n-grams.
The more characters one combines per entry in the feature vector, the
more precisely the word is represented, but the greater also the number of
columns. In the case of tri-grams, for example, ELVIS would be represented
by entries at ELV, LVI, VIS. Using 5-grams, the entire word can be represented
in one column of the feature vector, albeit at the cost of 265 columns in the
feature vector. In general, the number of columns grows exponentially with
n.
In addition to marking the presence or absence of character combinations,
one can keep frequency counts of these combinations in the feature vector
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columns. This technique is known as n-gram extraction. The frequency
counts can be normalised (scaled) to the total count to measure the relative
probability of a feature vector. Whether normalised feature vectors can bet-
ter detect worm mutations than unnormalised (that is, with raw frequency
counts) feature vectors is investigated in Section 5.3.3.2.
One would expect that, given infinite memory and processing time, the
higher the value of n, the more precise the information obtained. This,
however, is not the case. Essentially, the probability at which individual n-
grams occur is estimated by measuring their relative frequencies. Neverthe-
less, there will almost always be situations where one encounters an n-gram
that has not been seen before. Using frequency counts, this n-gram would
be estimated at a nonzero probability, even though its relative probability is
zero, a problem known as the zero frequency problem [92].
Lower values of n reduce the zero frequency problem. For example, using
5-grams an unlikely word such as SLIVE would receive a non-zero probability
even though it is improbable that it will reoccur. Using 3-grams, however,
SLIVE would occupy (among others) the features SLI and IVE, which are
more likely to occur again in words such as SLIDE and HIVE.
Section 5.1.3 evaluates the trade-offs involved in selecting the value of n
and how it impacts worm detection.
4.4.2 Implementing n-gram extraction
Since worms are often transmitted in the form of binary executables, the full
byte range is used as the alphabet. That is, rather than using just letters A
to Z or even displayable ASCII characters, the byte values 0 to 255 are used,
and hence no distinction between displayable and non-displayable characters
is made.
The fundamental data structure in the n-gram extractor implementation
is an integer array of frequency counts. The length of this array is dependent
on the n-gram size, requiring 256n elements, and is practically feasible only
for small values of n. Assuming 4-byte integers, frequency arrays for n-grams
sizes 1, 2, 3, and 4 consume 1 KB, 256 KB, 64 MB, and 16 GB of memory
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Figure 4.7: Feature extraction using a sliding window and bi-gram
frequency table.
respectively. For n-gram sizes of 4 and above, these frequency tables would
need to be implemented using data-structures such as hashtables or Bloom
filters [93] to be practically feasible. Alternatively, n-grams for higher values
could be estimated by, for example, using the 2v -gram [52] technique.
The frequency table is populated by a sliding window in the captured flow.
At each position of the sliding window, its value is read and the corresponding
count incremented in frequency table entry, as shown in Figure 4.7. Thus
the processing cost of n-gram extraction grows linearly with the flow size.
4.5 Machine learning classifiers
The previous section explained how to transform the network data into a form
that is readable by machine learning algorithms by extracting n-gram feature
vectors. This section now explains where the machine learning algorithms fit
into the picture, and how they detect worms by using feature vectors.
The machine learning algorithms operate in two phases: a training phase
and a prediction phase, as shown in Figure 4.8. In the training phase, the
machine learning algorithms are supplied with a set of flows that are marked
either malicious or benign, depending on whether they contain a worm. Con-
ceptually, the training phase then derives a pattern that distinguishes mali-
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Figure 4.8: Machine learning algorithms train classifiers to distin-
guish between malicious and benign flows.
cious and benign flows. For example, for Support Vector Machines this pat-
tern consists of the support vectors that define the separating hyperplane, as
covered in Section 3.2.2.
The product of the training phase is a machine learning classifier capable
of labelling unknown flows as malicious or benign. In a production envi-
ronment, the training phase may be performed oﬄine, while the prediction
phase classifies live flows as they arrive on the wire.
4.6 Architecture revisited
Figure 4.9 summarises the stages involved in both the training and classifi-
cation phases. The training phase captures network traffic at the flow level,
extracts feature vectors using n-grams and then implicitly derives a pattern
to distinguish between malicious and benign feature vectors.
Similarly, in the classification stage, which is performed online, feature
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Figure 4.9: Stages involved in the training and classification
phases.
vectors are extracted from captured flows. The classifier then uses informa-
tion from the training phase to classify feature vectors.
4.7 Deployment
Network intrusion detection systems are typically deployed behind company
firewalls, acting as a second line of defence for the local area network, as
shown in Figure 4.10. Installing the intrusion detection system behind the
firewall makes sense. The firewall’s job is to block unwanted traffic, typically
by disabling traffic to ports that are known to be out of service or that are
intended for internal traffic only. Since the data blocked by the firewall is
unwanted, there is no point to load this traffic onto the intrusion detection
system since it would only needlessly increase its workload.
Where does the machine learning worm detector fit into the picture? It
could be deployed (a) as a module injected into an existing network intrusion
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Figure 4.10: Intrusion detection systems are typically deployed
behind an organisation’s firewall and provide the second line of
defence to all hosts on the local area network.
detection system such as Snort or Bro, (b) as a standalone system, or (c) in
parallel to other intrusion detection systems, working together for example
with majority voting. To keep the worm detector independent of the con-
straints and weaknesses of other intrusion detection systems, this dissertation
builds the worm detector as a standalone unit.
In advanced configurations the firewall and network intrusion detection
system work together as a team. In such configurations the network intrusion
detection system sends rules to the firewall upon detecting malicious traffic.
To keep the worm detector simple, this dissertation does not add co-operation
with firewalls to its worm detector.
4.8 Summary
This chapter described how machine learning techniques can be applied to
detect worm mutations:
• Worm model. The worm model used in this dissertation and defined
in this chapter is a stream of binary data that consists of three parts:
application-specific data, an exploit code, and an executable payload.
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A worm mutation is as a worm that exploits the same vulnerability as
the original worm, but executes a different payload on infiltration.
• Capturing network traffic. Network traffic is captured at the flow
level rather than at the packet level so that worms spanning multiple
packets can be scanned for in their entirety.
• Feature extraction is performed on captured flows to create feature
vectors that the machine learning algorithms can understand. The
feature vectors are n-grams, with optimal value of n to be determined
in later chapters.
• Machine learning algorithms operate in two phases. In the training
phase, the machine learning algorithm is supplied with a set of flows
that are labelled as either malicious or benign from which it implicitly
deduces a distinguishing pattern. The product of the training phase is
a classifier capable of classifying unknown flows.
• Deployment of the worm detector is intended behind company fire-
walls, acting as a second line of defence for the local area network.
This chapter set the scene for the following chapters, which investigate
whether the machine-learning enabled worm detector introduced in this chap-
ter can successfully detect worm mutations.
Chapter 5
Support Vector Machines for
worm detection
The previous chapter introduced an architecture that uses machine learning
to detect worm mutations. This chapter puts this architecture to the test.
Specifically, this chapter investigates whether Support Vector Machines
(SVMs) are suitable for detecting worm mutations. It compares the efficacy
of various SVM configurations and associated kernel functions in classifying
worm mutations. This chapter will show that Support Vector Machines are
suited for detecting mutations of known worms, and that the optimal con-
figuration is a linear kernel with unnormalised bi-gram frequency counts as
input.
5.1 Experiment design
The design of this chapter’s experiments fall into three parts: (i) the worm
mutations used for training and test data, (ii) the feature extraction from
network flows, and (iii) finding the optimal configuration of the Support
Vector Machine.
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Figure 5.1: Synthetic flows. Malicious flows consist of random
data but contain the worms signature at an arbitrary position,
whereas benign flows are just random data.
5.1.1 Synthetic mutations
A wide spectrum of training data is critical to the SVM’s success – the
wider the spectrum, the more likely the training phase can detect a pattern
common to the worm mutations. However, for a thorough investigation the
spectrum of available worm mutations is too narrow, which is why the exper-
iments in this chapter rely on synthetically generated flows. By synthetically
generating flows, the experiments gain not just control over the number of
mutations, but also their size and the contents of their payload.
The synthetic flows will either be malicious or benign, as shown in Fig-
ure 5.1. Malicious flows are where the worm’s signature has been injected
into the random data, effectively simulating a worm mutation. Recall from
the worm model definition in Section 4.1 that a signature is a string or reg-
ular expression that identifies the worm. To be consistent with this worm
model, the signatures injected into the flows are part of the exploit code.
Benign flows are simply random data simulating normal traffic.
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Figure 5.2: Synthetic worms loosely based on the Slapper worm
consist of random-sized chunks of SSL traces used as padding.
The challenge in using random padding lies in finding a random distri-
bution that realistically emulates normal traffic. To overcome this problem,
the synthetic flows are padded with randomly selected chunks of benign flow
traces. To verify this approach, the classifier’s performance on flows using
padding generated with a uniform random number generator and padding
generated from benign flow traces are compared.
Key to the validity of this chapter’s experiments is that although the
signature of a synthetically generated worm is known, this information is not
passed on to the SVM. The Support Vector Machine is only told whether the
flow is benign or malicious, and must deduce the signature itself.
5.1.1.1 Synthetic Slapper worm
To make the synthetic flows realistic, the injected worm signature is loosely
based on the Slapper [31] worm, which has a widely publicised and fairly
simple signature. The Slapper worm allows the attacker to run arbitrary and
potentially malicious code on the infected host before building a botnet1 of all
infected hosts. The Slapper worm exploited an OpenSSL [32] vulnerability
in older versions of the Apache web server, and has a signature that carries
1A botnet is a network of infected hosts that can be remote controlled to perform
malicious tasks.
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Figure 5.3: Continuous, split, and jumbled signatures.
the string TERM=xterm2. The synthetic flows were generated from randomly
selected benign SSL traces, with the string TERM=xterm injected into the
malicious flows (Figure 5.2).
5.1.1.2 Continuous, split, and jumbled signatures
Thus far this chapter has assumed that all signatures are continuous – a single
block of data as shown at the top of Figure 5.3(a). Given that continuous
data can be easily matched in network flows, worm authors have attempted
to distort their worms to escape detection.
The easiest way to distort the worm is by splitting the continuous blocks
at arbitrary locations, resulting in split signatures as shown in Figure 5.3(b).
A further refinement is to randomly rearrange the split blocks, leaving a
jumbled signature as depicted in Figure 5.3(c).
2Note that this is an oversimplified version of the signature used by Snort and Bro.
Both additionally consider some of Slapper’s other actions, such as probing servers and
exhausting their connection pools.
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5.1.1.3 Corrupted signatures
How does the classifier handle corrupted signatures? To answer this question,
a test set was created containing corrupted (or dirty) signatures. To create
this test set, parts of the signatures in the test set were randomly corrupted
to various degrees using a uniform random number generator. The classifier’s
accuracy distinguishing malicious from benign flows was then observed.
The detector sits at the TCP layer of the network stack, meaning it deals
with fully reassembled TCP flow payloads and therefore should not have
to worry about data corruption caused by communication errors, such as
dropped, reordered, or corrupted packets. Nonetheless there are two good
reasons to investigate how the classifier copes with corrupted signatures.
First, polymorphic worms often mutate themselves by corrupting their
signatures. Recall that polymorphic worms are worms that try to evade
detection by mutating themselves from hop to hop as they traverse the net-
work. Understanding, then, how the classifiers cope with corrupted signa-
tures would give insight as to how well they would be able to detect poly-
morphic worms.
And second, since a corrupted signature is by definition a worm mutation,
investigating corrupted signatures gives further insight into how robust the
classifiers are in detecting worm mutations.
5.1.2 Kernel configuration
The choice of kernel is arguably the most important Support Vector Ma-
chine parameter. Section 3.2.3 selected three candidate kernels to test: the
linear kernel, the radial basis function (RBF) kernel, and the string kernel.
Table 5.1 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of these kernels.
Within each kernel, optimal values for the following parameters need to
be determined:
• The linear kernel has only a single parameter that can be tuned –
the C value. This parameter determines the softness of the margin
classes. The softer the margin, the more erroneously placed data points
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Kernel Advantages Disadvantages
Linear • simplest kernel • works only in input space
• only one hyperparameter
RBF • good general performance • tune two hyperparameters
• implicitly maps data to vs. only one for linear
higher dimension
String • optimised for string matching • slow compared to linear
and RBF
Table 5.1: Comparison of the linear, radial basis function (RBF),
and string kernels.
it tolerates. Essentially it is the trade-off between fitting the training
data and maximising the margin.
• There are two parameters that can be tuned in RBF kernels: C and
gamma. The RBF’s C parameters serves the same purpose as the linear
kernel’s. The gamma value controls the width of the RBF kernel, and
hence the smoothness of the RBF.
• In the string kernel the two key parameters are the substring length,
and whether to consider all lengths up to the substring length or just the
given length itself. The effect of varying the substring length relative
to the signature length for both fixed and variable-length strings is
investigated.
After determining optimal parameter values for the individual kernels,
their performance is compared in terms of classification accuracy, training
time, and prediction time. Once these experiments yield an optimal kernel,
the optimal n-gram size and whether normalising extracted features improves
classifier performance is investigated.
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5.1.3 Feature extraction
As discussed in Section 4.4, feature extraction for SVMs involves extracting
n-gram frequency counts from the flow payloads. One of this chapter’s aims
is to investigate the trade-offs involved in selecting the value of n.
Since this work’s ultimate goal is to detect worms in a real-life environ-
ment – facing limited memory and processing power – this work restricts
itself to 1-, 2-, and 3-grams, consuming 1 KB, 256 KB, 64 MB respectively3.
Higher values of n and alternative representations are picked up again in
future work (Section 9.3).
Of the three candidate kernels introduced in Section 3.2.3, only the lin-
ear and RBF kernel require n-gram extraction since both require vectors as
inputs, whereas the string kernel works with character (byte) strings natively.
5.1.4 Training data size
As mentioned previously, a classifier’s accuracy can be greatly affected by
the spectrum of the training data. By employing synthetic worms the exper-
iments are not limited by the number of available worm mutations, which
leads to the question how sensitive the classifier accuracy really is to the
training data spectrum.
To answer this question, the experiments gauge the training data size to
test the impact on classifier accuracy. Ideally the classifier should demon-
strate good accuracy even for small training data sets, as the number of
available worm mutations to serve as training data in the wild will be lim-
ited.
5.1.5 Data-to-signature ratio
The worm model in Section 4.1 defined a worm mutation as a worm that
carries a different executable payload but uses the same exploit to gain access
into the remote system. But the executable payload is not limited to be the
same size as that carried by the original worm, which means that mutations
3These size values are calculated assuming 4-byte integers
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Worm Payload Signature Ratio
(bytes) (bytes)
Code Red 4039 396 9:1
Slammer 404 16 24:1
Witty 1184 64 18:1
Distcc 1740 307 6:1
Minishare 8600 2252 4:1
Table 5.2: Approximate data-to-signature ratios for past worms.
The values for Distcc and Minishare are based on the average sizes
of the mutations generated in Chapter 7.
of the same worm may have different sizes. Rather than compare worm
mutations in terms of their absolute size, this dissertation compares worms
based on the amount of total data relative to the size of exploit code – the
data-to-signature ratio.
Worm mutations in the real world thus have different data-to-signature
ratios, and so the experiments investigate the impact of mixed data-to-
signature ratios in training and test data sets on classifier accuracy. The
expected result is lower accuracy for higher ratios as the large amounts of
padding data swamp the signature.
Table 5.2 shows approximate data-to-signature ratios for the Code Red [6],
Slammer [8], Witty [37], Distcc [94] and Minishare [95] worms. All the worms
have a data-to-signature below 25:1; this chapter will use this figure as a
yardstick when evaluating the performance of the classifier.
5.1.6 False alarm rates
Thus far, accuracy served as the measure of how well flows are classified.
While accuracy is an intuitive measure, it does not tell the whole story. In
intrusion detection, the false alarm rate is important, since falsely classifying
flows as malicious (false positive) means that legitimate traffic is blocked.
Conversely, falsely classifying flows as benign (false negative) means that
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worms pass undetected.
Receiver operator characteristics (ROC) [96] curve analysis presents a
way of quantifying the trade-off between the detection rate and the false
alarm rate. ROC curves have their roots in signal detection and medical
decision-making, and have recently become a popular way of analysing ma-
chine learning classifiers. Appendix B provides a detailed overview of ROC
curve analysis.
The ROC curve for a classifier is generated by plotting the true positive
rate versus the false positive rate at various confidence intervals. The true
positive rate is calculated by dividing the number of true positives by the
total number of positives; similarly the false positive rate is calculated by
dividing the number of false positives by the total number of negatives. A
single classification will produce a single point in the ROC space and a curve
is obtained by varying the classifier’s confidence (see also Appendix B).
The performance metric that can be obtained from these curves is the
total area under the curve (AUC) [97]. The larger the area, the better the
classifier.
5.2 Experimental setup
All experiments were performed on an Intel Xeon with a 2.40GHz CPU and
1GB of RAM. Libsvm [98] version 1.8 was used as the Support Vector Ma-
chine implementation for linear and RBF kernels, and libs [99] version 1.3, a
libsvm modification, was used for string kernels.
As a baseline for each experiment, a training set of 100 flows, half ma-
licious and benign, was used. The implications of this training data size is
investigated in Section 5.3.4 below. A test set of size 1000, again half mali-
cious and half benign flows was used; each experiment was repeated 50 times4
with different data sets to obtain averages and standard deviations.
Note that the equal ratio of malicious to benign flows in the test set is
4The number of iterations (repeats) was investigated, showing that the accuracy levels
stabilised at 50 iterations.
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Figure 5.4: Prediction accuracy at various data-to-signature ratios
for flows padded with random and SSL data.
not representative of real network traffic, where the proportion of benign
flows is likely to be much higher. However, the aim of the experiments is to
determine with which accuracy the classifier can classify unknown network
flows, and for an unbiased result there should be an equal probability that it
receives either a malicious or a benign flow.
5.3 Analysis
This section presents the results of the experiments described in the previous
section.
5.3.1 Synthetic mutation format
Figure 5.4 shows the prediction accuracy at various data-to-signature ratios
for flows padded with random and SSL data. As expected, it is much harder
to distinguish between malicious and benign worms when padded with SSL
data. A likely explanation is that the SSL padding tends to have large chunks
repeated among all flows, thereby diluting the signature. Using uniform
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Figure 5.5: Prediction accuracy at various C values using the linear
kernel and a data-to-signature ratio of 100 : 1.
random data as padding, on the other hand, highlights the signature.
Since SSL padded flows are both more realistic and constitute a harder
problem, henceforth only results for SSL padded data are shown.
5.3.2 Choosing the optimal kernel
This section answers the question as to which is the optimal kernel for the
SVM. It does so by first examining each of the linear, RBF, and string ker-
nel in turn to find each kernel’s optimal configuration before comparing the
kernels themselves.
5.3.2.1 Configuring the linear kernel
The effect of varying the C parameter was investigated by performing a 10-
fold cross validation. A dataset of 1000 entries was split into 10 equal parts,
of which 1 was used to train the classifier and the other 9 to test it. This
was repeated with a range of C values.
As the graph in Figure 5.5 shows, altering the C value did not affect
the classifier’s performance; henceforth Libsvm’s default C value of 1 will be
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Figure 5.6: RBF kernel grid search plotting gamma against C.
used. The results indicate that the data classes are totally linearly separable.
5.3.2.2 Configuring the RBF kernel
A grid-based cross validation was performed to determine the optimal pa-
rameter values for the training data. That is, an exhaustive range of C and
gamma combinations were tested, each time using a 10-fold cross validation
as used in previous case with the linear kernel’s C value. Libsvm’s [98] grid.py
script was used to perform this cross-validation.
Figure 5.6 shows results obtained from this grid search using a data set
with a data-to-signature ratio of 25:1, with C ranging from 20 to 220 and
gamma ranging from 20 to 2−20. All points that achieved 100% accuracy are
optimal parameter combinations for the RBF kernel; henceforth a parameter
combination of C= 24 and gamma= 2−14 will be used.
5.3.2.3 Configuring the string kernel
Figure 5.7 shows the effect of varying the substring length relative to the
signature length for both fixed and variable-length strings. The results show
that fixed length substrings and variable length substrings achieve similar
CHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 73
 50
 55
 60
 65
 70
 75
 80
 85
 90
 95
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8  2
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
String- to signature-length ratio
variable
fixed
Figure 5.7: String kernel accuracy at various string-length to
signature-length ratios comparing fixed and variable length strings.
The data-to-signature ratio was 100:1.
prediction accuracies, with the performance peaking at a string-to-signature
ratio of approximately 0.5. Given the synthetic Slapper’s 10 character signa-
ture, this corresponds to a substring length of 5.
Although fixed and variable length substrings achieve comparable lev-
els of accuracy, the processing time with variable-length strings is orders of
magnitude greater than using fixed-length strings, due to the number of sub-
strings increasing exponentially when considering all possible substrings up
to a certain length rather than just the substring length itself.
Based on the above findings the optimal string kernel configuration – and
the one used henceforth – is a fixed length substring to signature ratio of 0.5.
5.3.2.4 Comparing prediction accuracy
Now that the the optimal parameter settings for the individual kernels has
been found, their classification accuracy can be compared. The graph in
Figure 5.8 shows that all three kernels show similar accuracies. By a small
margin the string kernel exhibits the best accuracy, closely followed by the
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Figure 5.8: The prediction accuracy at various data-to-signature
ratios for the linear, RBF, and string kernel.
linear kernel, and finally the RBF kernel. The accuracy trails off at 50% since
at this point the classifier is randomly guessing whether a flow is malicious
or benign, and hence is only as accurate as flipping a coin.
Since the results show no clear winner in accuracy, the performance in
training and prediction times are compared next.
5.3.2.5 Comparing training time
The graph in Figure 5.9 compares the time taken to train the classifier. As
expected, the time taken increases with data-to-signature ratio due to the
increase in total data. The results show that training SVMs using linear and
RBF kernels is considerably quicker than training with a string kernel.
5.3.2.6 Comparing prediction time
Arguably, the training time is not the key performance measure, since one can
train classifiers oﬄine; prediction (classification), on the other hand, happens
online and is thus pivotal in the choice of kernel. Figure 5.10 shows the time
taken to predict a single flow’s class. As was the case with training time, the
CHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 75
 0.1
 1
 10
 100
 1000
 10000
 0.1  1  10  100  1000
Tr
ain
ing
 tim
e 
(m
s)
Data-to-signature ratio
string
linear
RBF
Figure 5.9: Time taken to train the linear, RBF, and string kernel.
This is the time for a single flow, and must be multiplied by the
training data size for an estimate of the total training time.
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 10
 100
 1000
 10000
 100000
 0.1  1  10  100  1000
Pr
ed
ict
ion
 tim
e 
(m
s)
Data-to-signature ratio
string
RBF
linear
Figure 5.10: Time taken to predict a flow’s class using the linear,
RBF, and string kernel.
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string kernel’s prediction time is between one and two orders of magnitude
higher than for the linear and RBF kernels.
5.3.2.7 Summary
Which kernel is best? The string kernel proved only marginally more accurate
than its competitors, leaving classification time as the tie breaker. This takes
the string kernel out of the race since it is much slower in both training
and classification, and leaves only the linear and RBF kernel. Since the
RBF kernel is sensitive to it’s parameter values (C and gamma) and is more
complex than the linear kernel, the linear kernel was selected as the optimal
kernel for this scenario.
5.3.3 Feature extraction
Having established the linear kernel as the kernel of choice, the next step
is to examine the other factors that affect a classifier’s performance. This
section finds the optimal n-gram size, and determines whether normalising
the frequency count improves accuracy.
5.3.3.1 Optimal n-gram size
The graph in Figure 5.11 shows the prediction accuracy for uni-grams, bi-
grams and tri-grams (using a linear kernel). It illustrates that prediction
accuracy increases with higher values of n, as expected. Using tri-grams,
all flows at a data-to-signature ratio of approximately 12:1, up to a data-to-
signature ratio of 100:1 are classified with 90% accuracy.
Unsurprisingly, uni-grams perform considerably worse than bi-grams and
tri-grams. The accuracy gain of tri-grams over bi-grams is negligible, which
means the best choice for this scenario is to use the smaller of the two for
performance reasons.
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Figure 5.11: Prediction accuracy at various data-to-signature ra-
tios for uni-grams, bi-grams and tri-grams.
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Figure 5.12: Prediction accuracy versus data-to-signature ratios
for normalised (scaled) and unnormalised (unscaled) data.
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Figure 5.13: The effect of training data size on prediction accuracy
for various data-to-signature ratios.
5.3.3.2 Impact of normalising frequency counts
The graph in Figure 5.12 compares the accuracy of unnormalised versus
normalised frequency counts. Normalising improves accuracy as expected,
but only marginally so. Since normalising comes at a great computational
cost and with hardly noticeable accuracy gains, all further experiments are
conducted with unnormalised feature vectors.
5.3.4 Training data size
The graph in Figure 5.13 shows how accuracy varies with training data size.
As anticipated, the accuracy increases with training data size: the larger
the training data size, the higher the chance of the worm’s distinguishing
signature surfacing as the common pattern.
The results are highly encouraging. As shown in Table 5.2, worms tend
to have a data-to-signature lower than 25:1, for which the classifier achieves
above 90% accuracy even for the smallest training data size. Accuracy climbs
with increasing training data size, reaching 100% for training data sizes of
100 and above.
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Figure 5.14: Prediction accuracy at various data-to-signature ra-
tios for different synthetic worm models.
Regrettably, in a real-life setting, one cannot pick the training data size
as the number of available traces is constrained5. However, this information
can be used to guarantee certain levels of accuracy. Consider as an example,
that an accuracy of at least 90% needs to be achieved and that flows with
a data-to-signature ratio of 100 are used. This graph can then be used to
determine that a training data size of 100 is required to attain the desired
accuracy level.
5.3.5 Continuous, split, and jumbled signatures
The graph in Figure 5.14 shows the prediction accuracy for the different
signature classes, where the classifier was trained solely with continuous sig-
natures. The graph reveals that the classifier is still able to detect distorted
signatures, even when the signature is split or jumbled, albeit at a slight cost
of accuracy. Interestingly, split and jumbled signatures are recognised with
near identical accuracy, showing that the classifier is equally robust to the
5Chapter 7 suggests a workaround of this constraint by generating worm mutations
automatically from a given source worm.
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Figure 5.15: Prediction accuracy at various degrees of signature
corruption. Data-to-signature ratio is 25:1.
location and order of the worm signature.
Unlike jumbled signatures, which consist of split signature fragments that
have been reordered, jumbled with overlapping signatures do not respect
other signature fragments’ boundaries, and hence overlapping may occur.
This explains the bell shape of its graph. For small data-to-signature ra-
tios, the chances of overlapping fragments is significantly higher, thereby
corrupting the signature’s characters. This is confirmed by the relatively
poor accuracy for data-to-signature ratios of less than 10. Beyond that size
overlapping is mitigated, and the accuracy curve eventually approaches that
of split and jumbled signatures.
5.3.6 Corrupted signatures
Figure 5.15 plots accuracy against various degrees of corruption and shows
that the classifier remains reasonably accurate up to 10% corruption, after
which it declines steeply. These results are encouraging since they show that
the classifiers do not fail abruptly when a signature is corrupted, hinting at
resilience to polymorphic worms.
CHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 81
5.3.7 Mixed data-to-signature ratios
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Figure 5.16: Prediction accuracy at various data-to-signature ra-
tios comparing classifiers trained and tested with a single data-to-
signature ratio and mixed data-to-signature ratio.
The graph in Figure 5.16 compares uniform with mixed data-to-signature
ratios. The mixed data-to-signature ratios were normally distributed so that
in each comparison, the mean of the mixed data-to-signature ratios was set
equal to the corresponding uniform data-to-signature ratio. The standard
deviation for the mixed data-to-signature ratios is 20 for this graph6.
The results indicate that the classification accuracy for mixed data-to-
signature ratios is lower than for data sets with uniform data-to-signature ra-
tios. Classifiers can cope better with mixed data-to-signature ratios for data
sets with low data-to-signature ratios (such as 25:1), but are more severely
affected for higher data-to-signature ratios (such as 100:1 and 200:1). This is
good news given that worms typically have data-to-signatures less than 25:1,
as shown in Table 5.2.
A likely explanation is offered by the way n-gram counts are extracted
6Standard deviations in the range 1 to 20 were tested; the trend was that accuracy
decreases with increasing standard deviation, as expected.
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Figure 5.17: ROC curve showing the trade-off between true and
false positive rates for various data-to-signature ratios.
from flows. By definition, flows with a higher data-to-signature ratio contain
more application specific data and executable payload, which the machine
learning classifier treats as noise. Mixed data-to-signature ratios may there-
fore dilute the signal (signature relative to data), making it harder for the
classifier to spot the signature.
5.3.8 False alarms
The graph in Figure 5.17 shows how the AUC decreases for increasing data-
to-signature ratios, as expected. Note that the AUC should never be less
than 0.5 since the diagonal line joining co-ordinates (0, 0) and (0, 1) signals
random guessing by the classifier. The confidence values were obtained by
calculating the distance to the hyperplane [78].
5.4 Summary
This chapter tested the suitability of Support Vector Machines for detecting
worm mutations, with encouraging results:
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• High accuracy for typical worm data-to-signature-ratios. Worms
typically have data-to-signature ratios below 25:1, and for these ratios
the classifier consistently achieved very high accuracy.
• Choice of the linear kernel as the optimal kernel. Although all
three kernels (linear, RBF, and string) demonstrated similar accuracies,
the linear kernel and RBF kernels clearly outperformed the string kernel
on training and classification time. The tie between the linear and RBF
kernels was ultimately decided in favour of the linear kernel due to its
simplicity.
• Choice of bi-gram feature vectors. Bi-gram feature vectors yielded
the best accuracy-performance trade-off, clearly outperforming uni-
grams on accuracy while closely matching the accuracy of tri-grams;
at the same time bi-grams occupy significantly less memory than tri-
grams.
• Choice of unnormalised feature vectors. Normalising the fre-
quency counts improves accuracy only marginally but at the cost of
significantly increasing training and prediction times.
• Resilience to signature distortions. SVMs demonstrated resilience
to split and jumbled signature mutations. SVMs also demonstrated
limited resilience to signature corruption, with accuracy hardly affected
until 10% corruption.
• Resilience to mixed data-to-signature ratios. Mixed data-to-
signature ratios reduce the accuracy only to minor degree for small
data-to-signature ratios.
• False alarm rates. Receiver operator characteristics graphs confirm
that the false alarm rates for low data-to-signature ratios is lower than
for high data-to-signature ratios.
The following chapter compares these results with two alternative ma-
chine learning techniques: Gaussian Processes, and K-nearest neighbours.
Chapter 6
Alternative machine learning
methods
The experiments in the previous chapter demonstrated that Support Vector
Machines can successfully detect worm mutations. Nevertheless, Support
Vector Machines exhibit some weaknesses, and this chapter explores whether
alternative machine learning techniques can match, or surpass, the perfor-
mance of Support Vector Machines.
One such weakness of Support Vector Machines, already alluded to in
Section 3.3.1, is that they do not return any measure of confidence with their
prediction; the only way to obtain such a confidence measure is with ad-hoc
workarounds such as calculating the distance to the hyperplane. Without
a confidence measure, the worm detector has no chance to second-guess or
override the prediction in uncertain cases.
Another weakness is that Support Vector Machines are natively binary
classifiers, but in practice it is often necessary to distinguish between more
than two classes. So far this dissertation was content with a binary classifier
that is trained with a single worm and can predict whether a flow carries
mutations of that specific worm. To extend the classifier to support multi-
ple worms, each worm would have to be assigned its own class, something
Support Vector Machines do not natively support. Workarounds have been
proposed, such as cascading multiple binary classifiers in one versus rest [56]
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fashion. For a comparison of methods to add multi-class classification to
Support Vector Machines, see [100].
In light of these weaknesses, are there better alternatives to Support Vec-
tor Machines to detect worm mutations? This chapter looks at two candi-
dates introduced in Chapter 3 and compares their performance to Support
Vector Machines:
• Gaussian Processes [16] return confidence values with their predictions,
and this chapter investigates whether these values could help reduce
false alarm rates relative to Support Vector Machines without sacrific-
ing speed. Gaussian Processes also natively support multiple classes.
• K-nearest neighbour [17] is a simple and intuitive algorithm, and this
chapter explores whether K-nearest neighbours can match the level
of accuracy of Support Vector Machines. Like Gaussian Processes,
K-nearest neighbours natively supports multiple classes, though like
Support Vector Machines it does not return confidence values.
Table 6.1 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the three machine
learning techniques investigated in this chapter.
6.1 Experiment design
This section describes in-turn the configurations and experimental setup
of Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes and K-nearest neighbours
methods compared in this chapter’s experiments.
6.1.1 Support Vector Machines
The experiments will use the optimal Support Vector Machine configura-
tion established in the previous chapter, namely a linear kernel using unnor-
malised bi-gram feature vectors.
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Method Advantages Disadvantages
SVM • previous chapter demonstrated • no confidence value
suitable to detect worm mutations • multiple classes not
• highly optimised implementations natively supported
available
GP • returns confidence value • implementations
• multi-class support not optimised
KNN • simple and intuitive algorithm • no confidence value
• multi-class support • slow for large training
• supports incremental learning data sizes
Table 6.1: Advantages and disadvantages of Support Vector Ma-
chines, Gaussian Processes, and K-nearest neighbours.
6.1.2 Gaussian Processes
As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, a shortcoming of Support Vector
Machines is that they do not return a confidence value with their predictions,
while Gaussian Processes return such confidence values as part of their results
automatically. Since confidence values could be used to reduce the number
of false alarms, the aim is to show how effective Gaussian Processes are in
detecting worm mutations.
Like Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes are kernel machines,
with the kernel measuring the similarity between two points. Section 5.3.2
of the previous chapter showed that the linear kernel was the optimal kernel
for Support Vector Machines, implying that the data (the worm flows) are
linearly separable. Based on this finding, the experiments in this chapter will
employ the linear kernel for Gaussian Processes as well. Besides the kernel
there are no further configuration parameters for Gaussian Processes.
For the experiments in this work the Matlab implementation for the Gaus-
sian Processes classifier in [101] was ported to C so that it can be plugged
into the architecture described in Section 4.2. The implementation stays true
to the original Matlab implementation by using matrices and associated op-
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erations; the C port uses the Gnu Scientific Library (GSL) [102] to handle
matrix operations. The implementation was validated by comparing results
for a wide range of input test data with the original Matlab implementation.
6.1.3 K-nearest neighbours
K-nearest neighbours is arguably the most straightforward supervised ma-
chine learning algorithm. Like Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Pro-
cesses, K-nearest neighbours is a kernel machine. For the same reasons as
Gaussian Processes – the previous chapter established the data as linearly
separable and the linear kernel as the optimal kernel – this chapter’s exper-
iments use a linear kernel for K-nearest neighbours as well. This means all
three classifiers will be equipped with a linear kernel.
This leaves the K value, the number of nearest neighbours participating
in the majority vote, for which the experiments first need to find an optimal
value before comparing K-nearest neighbours to Support Vector Machines
and Gaussian Processes. As mentioned in Section 3.4, increasing K tends to
reduce the impact of noise, but simultaneously blurs the boundaries between
classes.
The implementation loads the training data into a GSL matrix [102], for
compatibility reasons with the more complex classifiers that heavily depend
on matrices. For the same reason, every entry of the test data is loaded into
a GSL vector [102] one at a time. The remaining implementation follows
straight forwardly from the algorithm:
1. Compute the measure of similarity (in this case the Euclidean norm)
between the current test datum and every training data entry.
2. Sort these distances to find the K smallest distances.
3. Look up the class for each of these K training data entries and perform
a majority vote.
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6.1.4 Combining classifiers
What happens to the accuracy if the three machine learning classifiers are
combined? While several methods of combining different classifiers have
been proposed [103, 104, 105], this chapter’s experiments take the simplest
approach, which casts a majority vote of the individual classifiers outputs.
6.2 Analysis
This section analyses the results of comparing Support Vector Machines with
two alternative machine learning techniques: Gaussian Processes (GPs) and
K-nearest neighbours (KNNs). Initially, this section first establishes the op-
timal K-nearest neighbours configuration to use in this comparison.
6.2.1 Optimal number of neighbours in KNN
The expected result is that accuracy rises with the number of neighbours,
K, up to a certain threshold. Beyond this threshold, the vote will include
relatively distant data points that will distort the vote and lead to wrong
classifications. The aim, then, is to find the optimal number of neighbours
just before that threshold is exceeded. Furthermore, the prediction time may
rise with the number of neighbours, and thus another aim of this section is
to determine whether there is an accuracy-speed trade-off for increasing K.
The graphs in Figure 6.1 show how the classification accuracy is affected
by the number of neighbours for various training data sizes, with the number
of neighbours varying from 1 to the corresponding training data size. The
results show that there is no optimal number K across the various training
data sizes, implying that for best results K must be tuned to the training
data size. Table 6.2 lists the tuned K values, extracted from the results in
Figure 6.1, with which K-nearest neighbours will be configured for the further
experiments in this chapter.
The graph in Figure 6.2 shows how prediction time varies with the number
of neighbours. The results show that, prediction time is unaffected by K.
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Figure 6.1: Impact of the number of neighbours on the accuracy of
KNN for various training data sizes. The data-to-signature ratio
was 25:1.
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Training data size Number of Neighbours (K )
4 1
10 2
20 3
50 11
75 11
100 11
Table 6.2: Tuned K values extracted from Figure 6.1, with which
K-nearest neighbours will be configured hence forth.
This is because K is only used in the algorithm once the training data items
have been compared to the test data and sorted by distance to the test
data, respectively taking O(n) and O(nlogn), where n is the training data
size. Only then are the K nearest neighbours looked up, which is a constant
operation.
6.2.2 Comparison of machine learning methods
Equipped with the optimal configuration for K-nearest neighbours, this sec-
tion compares the classifiers in terms of accuracy, confidence value, prediction
and training time, as well as training data size and false alarm rates.
6.2.2.1 Accuracy
Figure 6.3 compares the Gaussian Processes, K-nearest neighbours, and Sup-
port Vector Machines accuracy. The graph confirms that Gaussian Processes
exhibit a similar accuracy to Support Vector Machines, being only slightly
less accurate than the SVMs. For data-to-signature ratios below 100:1 it is
approximately 2% less accurate. The results are similar enough, however, to
consider GPs as a serious alternative to SVMs to detect worm mutations.
The results further show that the K-nearest neighbours algorithm per-
forms considerably worse than both the Gaussian Processes and the Suppo
CHAPTER 6. ALTERNATIVE MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 91
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 1400
 1  10  100
Pr
ed
ict
ion
 tim
e 
(m
s)
# Neighbours
25:1
100:1
200:1
Figure 6.2: Impact of the number of neighbours on the prediction
time for various data-to-signature ratios.
Vector Machines. For data-to-signature ratios below 100:1 the KNN classifier
is approximately 20% to 25% worse than the other two classifiers.
6.2.2.2 Training data size
Section 5.3.4 showed that for Support Vector Machines, classification accu-
racy is affected by the training data size. The graph in Figure 6.4 shows that
Gaussian Processes are similarly affected by the number of training data en-
tries, with the prediction accuracy rising steadily with increasing training
data size.
Although the K-nearest neighbours algorithm does not train a classifier
as such (it only keeps a database of raw training data), it could still be
affected by the training data size, albeit to a lesser extent. The results
suggest, that unlike Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes, the
KNN’s classification accuracy does not increase steadily with training data
size. Rather, prediction accuracy hovers at 71−75%, reflecting that the value
of K is well-tuned to the training data size.
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Figure 6.3: Comparing the accuracy of SVMs, GPs, and KNN.
Training data size is 100.
6.2.2.3 Predictive likelihood
Since the previous section established that Gaussian Processes yield similar
accuracy to Support Vector Machines, this section investigates whether the
confidence value returned by the Gaussian Processes can help the decision
process to further improve the results, and possibly give Gaussian Processes
the edge over Support Vector Machines.
In Gaussian Processes the confidence measure is given by the predictive
likelihood, which is the average of the logarithms of all predictive posteriors.
A predictive likelihood of zero signals perfect confidence in the result. The
actual values for predictive likelihood – that is, which values indicate high or
low confidence – are problem specific and will be established in this section.
The graph in Figure 6.5 shows that the predictive likelihood decreases
as the data-to-signature ratio increases. This is in step with the accuracies
shown in the previous section implying that as the classification accuracy
decreases, so does the predictive likelihood. Overlaying the GP’s accuracies
from Figure 6.3 with the predictive likelihoods from Figure 6.5 reveals that
for a training data size of 100 a predictive likelihood between −0.655 and
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Figure 6.4: The impact of training data size on the prediction
accuracy for Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes, and
K-nearest neighbour. The data-to-signature ratio used is 25:1.
For KNN the number of neighbours is tuned to the training data
size as described in Section 6.2.1
−0.68 signals high confidence (above 90% accuracy).
The graph in Figure 6.6 shows the predictive likelihood of Gaussian Pro-
cesses at various training data sizes. As expected, the prediction confidence
also increases with training data size, in step with prediction accuracy. Over-
laying the GP’s accuracies from Figure 6.4 with the predictive likelihoods
from Figure 6.5 suggests that for a data-to-signature ratio of 25:1 a predic-
tive likelihood between −0.655 and −0.672 signals high confidence.
The results in this section confirm the predictive likelihood offers a prac-
tical guide as to when the classifier’s decision can be overruled.
6.2.2.4 Mixed data-to-signature ratios
Section 5.3.7 in the previous chapter showed that Support Vector Machines
can cope with mixed data-to-signature ratios for data sets with low mean
data-to-signature ratios (such as 25:1) at minimal loss of accuracy, but are
more severely affected for higher data-to-signature ratios (such as 100:1 and
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Figure 6.5: GPs predictive likelihood (confidence value) at various
data-to-signature ratios. Training data size is 100.
200:1).
The graph in Figure 6.7 compares Support Vector Machines to Gaussian
Processes and K-nearest neighbours at classifying data sets with fixed and
mixed data-to-signature ratios. The fixed data-to-signature ratio is 25:1 while
the mixed data-to-signature ratio is normally distributed with mean 25:1;
standard deviation of 20 was selected as in Section 5.3.7.
The results show that the accuracy obtained with Gaussian Processes
using mixed data-to-signature ratios is approximately 5% less than with fixed
data-to-signature ratios. By comparison, the gap in Support Vector Machines
is approximately 1%. The results for K-nearest neighbours show a drop of
approximately 13% in accuracy when the data-to-signature ratio is mixed.
As in the previous sections, the accuracy of the KNN algorithm at detecting
worm mutations of known worms remains significantly below that of Support
Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes.
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Figure 6.6: The impact of training data size on the prediction
confidence for Gaussian Processes at a data-to-signature ratio of
25:1.
6.2.2.5 False alarm rates
As with the Support Vector Machines in Section 5.3.8, Receiver Operator
Characteristics (ROC) graphs are used to investigate false alarm rates. Also
as in Section 5.3.8, the confidence measure for Support Vector Machines is
obtained by calculating the distance to the hyperplane. For K-nearest neigh-
bours instance ranking (based on the algorithm in [106]) was used. Gaussian
Processes as mentioned return the confidence measure natively.
Figure 6.8 compares the ROC curves for the Support Vector Machines,
Gaussian Processes, and K-nearest neighbours classifiers. The results confirm
that, as with accuracy, the KNN’s area under the curve (AUC) is considerably
less than both the Gaussian Processes or Support Vector Machines, meaning
that KNN suffers from a considerably higher number of false alarms.
As with accuracy, Gaussian Processes rival Support Vector Machines,
covering only a slightly less area under a curve.
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Figure 6.7: Prediction accuracy comparing SVMs, GPs, and KNN
trained and tested with a single fixed data-to-signature ratio and
a mixed data-to-signature ratio with comparable mean.
6.2.3 Combining classifiers
Figure 6.9 shows the prediction accuracy for classifier combinations using a
majority vote to obtain a classification. Normally it would make sense to
combine only an odd number of classifiers; for completeness, however, the
graph also shows the prediction accuracy for all possible pair combinations,
using a uniform random number generator to break ties where necessary.
From the results it can be seen that no combination beats the standalone
Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes classifiers. A probable
explanation is that Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes do not
complement each other well and show similar predictions for the same test
input data. K-nearest neighbours pulls down the average dramatically in
every duo in which it participates.
However, in combination with Support Vector Machines and Gaussian
Processes it appears to be outvoted most of the time, reducing the accuracy
only marginally.
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6.3 Summary
This chapter compared the performance of Support Vector Machines to that
of Gaussian Processes and K-nearest neighbours for detecting worm muta-
tions, with the following findings:
• SVMs and GPs show similar accuracies. Support Vector Ma-
chines and Gaussian Processes consistently showed similar accuracies,
with SVMs being marginally more accurate than GPs. Both Support
Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes achieve decisively higher ac-
curacy than K-nearest neighbour.
• Tuning the number of neighbours in KNN. The number of neigh-
bours in K-nearest neighbours needs to be tuned to the training data
size since there is no silver bullet value that works well across all train-
ing data sizes.
• GP confidence measures offer a practical guide. The confidence
measure returned by Gaussian Processes is low when accuracy is low,
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Figure 6.9: Prediction accuracy for various combinations of classi-
fiers. Data-to-signature ratio is 200:1, since it best illustrates the
trends of all data-to-signature ratios investigated.
rendering it a practical tool to further improve the accuracy of Gaussian
Processes.
• SVM and GP accuracy dependent on training data size. Ac-
curacy increases steadily with training data size for Support Vector
Machines and Gaussian Processes, the rise being steeper for Support
Vector Machines. K-nearest neighbours is tuned to training data size
and accuracy hovers just above 70% for all training data sizes.
• SVMs cope best with mixed data-to-signature ratios. Support
Vector Machines cope better with data sets of mixed data-to-signature
ratios than Gaussian Processes. K-nearest neighbours, however, does
not fare well with mixed data-to-signature ratios.
• SVMs and GPs have similar false alarm rates. Receiver oper-
ator characteristic graphs confirm that Gaussian Processes have only
a marginally higher false alarm rate than Support Vector Machines,
whereas K-nearest neighbours perform considerably worse.
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• Standalone SVM and GP classifiers work best. No combination
of classifiers (using majority vote) beats the standalone Support Vector
Machines and Gaussian Processes classifiers.
The final verdict is that Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes
were close rivals, with Support Vector Machines achieving a few percent
points higher accuracy on average. K-nearest neighbours were constantly
outperformed by Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes. The re-
sults also underline that for the techniques to work successfully, it is impor-
tant that a sufficient amount of training data is available. The next chapter
explores the possibility of automatically generating such training data.
Chapter 7
Generating worm mutations
The experiments in the previous two chapters showed that machine learning
techniques successfully detect worm mutations. More precisely, the results
showed that, given sufficient training data, the machine learning techniques
generate classifiers able to detect worm mutations.
However, as mentioned in Section 5.1.1, these experiments used synthetic
worm mutations for training data due to the lack of a wide spectrum of worm
mutations in the wild. For a real-life deployment of the machine learning
classifiers, obtaining a sufficiently large sample of training data poses a chal-
lenge. This chapter provides the missing link: a worm mutation generator
that automatically generates worm mutations.
This chapter first describes two approaches taken by the worm mutation
generator: structurally generating mutations by programmatically replacing
the executable payload, and randomly generating mutations by intercepting
malicious network flows and arbitrarily changing bytes in these flows. The
chapter then compares which of the two approaches yields the higher quality
training data in terms of classifier accuracy.
7.1 Structurally mutated worms
The concept of the structural worm mutation generator is to take a known
exploit and programatically change the executable payload to generate worm
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mutations. This approach is consistent with the worm model introduced in
Section 4.1, which defined worm mutations as worms sharing the same exploit
code, and reflects the approaches taken by past worm mutations such as Code
Red I and Code Red II.
Three real exploits were selected from the Metasploit framework [25], a
toolkit for exploit developers and security professionals, which provides a vast
collection of well documented exploits. The exploits were chosen according
to three key criteria. First, they had to be fairly straightforward to adapt
and so lend themselves well for creating worm mutations easily. Second, they
should blend into normal traffic in the sense that files such as those used for
the executable payload do not appear anomalous. And third, to be as diverse
from one another as possible in terms of communication protocol, payload
types and payload sizes, and so ensure that any results apply to a wide range
of worms.
The three worms created – named Distcc worm, Minishare worm, and
WarFTP worm after the services they exploit – are described in detail in the
following sections. These worms will also serve as the source worms for the
randomly mutated worms described later in Section 7.2.
7.1.1 Distcc worm
Distcc [94] is a C/C++ compiler framework for distributing builds across
several Linux machines on a network. An exploit [107] allowing arbitrary
execution of shell commands is made available by Metasploit.
The worm infection works in four stages:
1. Launching the exploit, which opens the door to execute arbitrary shell
commands on the target machine at the same user-level as the Distcc
daemon.
2. Uploading the worm’s executable payload in source code form. This is
achieved seamlessly by piping the source code into a temporary file on
the target host with the cat shell command.
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3. Compiling and executing the uploaded source code. This uses the gcc
(Gnu Compiler Collection) [108] command, which is present on most
Linux installations, and since Distcc is essentially a gcc wrapper, can
be safely assumed to be present on the victim.
4. Opening a backdoor telnet on port 4444 with a one line Perl command,
allowing arbitrary shell commands to be executed.
The executable payload would usually also include spreading logic, such
as generating a set of random IP addresses to probe next, and possibly some
potentially malicious behaviour, such as corrupting the infected machine’s
hard-drive. For this chapter’s experiments it suffices to infect the host and see
if the payload was executed, and so the worms do not include any spreading
logic or malicious payload.
7.1.2 Minishare worm
Minishare [95] is a trimmed-down web server for Microsoft Windows designed
for file sharing via a browser interface. A buffer overflow exploit [109] allowing
arbitrary Windows executables to be uploaded and executed is made available
by Metasploit.
The Minishare worm works in three stages:
1. The attacking host makes the executable payload available for down-
loading by binding to a known local port. The worm will call back on
this port once it has successfully infected the host.
2. The attacking host launches the exploit code against the target. If
successful, the worm then calls back on the attacking host to download
the executable payload.
3. The worm on the infected host launches the downloaded payload.
Unlike the Distcc worm, the Minishare worm does not download its ex-
ecutable payload in source form but as a binary executable. The download
callback is a simple HTTP request, which the attacking host serves with We-
brick [110], a minimalist web server that ships with Ruby. As with the Distcc
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worm, the executable payload injected by the generator into the Minishare
worm does not contain any spreading logic.
Since Minishare is primarily intended for file sharing, the uploading of
binary data will not appear anomalous. That would not be the case if Min-
ishare were intended for use as a regular web server where the dominant type
of file transferred would be text-based web pages.
7.1.3 WarFTP worm
WarFTP [111] daemon is a simple File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server for
Windows. A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability [112] is available in
Metasploit that allows arbitrary Windows executables to be uploaded and
launched.
The WarFTP worm works similarly to the Minishare worm:
1. The attacking host makes the executable payload available for down-
load by binding to a known local port.
2. The attacking host launches the exploit code against the target, and
on success calls back to download the payload.
3. The worm on the infected host launches the downloaded payload.
The difference between the WarFTP worm and the Minishare worm goes
beyond the use of different vulnerable services. The WarFTP worm was cho-
sen because it can carry payloads considerably larger than both Minishare
and Distcc without appearing anomalous. This allows the experiments to
verify whether, as would be expected, the data-to-signature ratio plays a sig-
nificant part in the quality of generated classifiers. The reason the WarFTP
worm does not appear anomalous is that it exploits the FTP service, and as
such it would not be uncommon to observe large file transfers in everyday
traffic.
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7.2 Randomly mutated worms
The basic idea of the random worm mutation generator is to (i) intercept a
worm en route from an attacking host to a target host, (ii) generate a set of
mutations by randomly mutating the worm’s byte stream, and (iii) forward
the generated mutations to the original target. The next sections discuss in
detail the random mutation generator’s requirements and its architecture.
7.2.1 Requirements
The random worm mutation generator must:
• Intercept worms en route from one host to the next. In order
for the system to mutate intercepted worms, it must be able to capture
them in their entirety. This involves reassembling worms that may have
been split into several packets, as well as reordering packets that arrive
out of order.
• Work transparently. The generator must forward all packets so
that the attacker remains unaware of its existence, effectively acting as
a transparent proxy.
• Determine whether the target was successfully infected. Af-
ter the worm’s mutations have been forwarded to the worm’s original
target host, the generator must determine whether the target was suc-
cessfully infected. Without this check the mutation can not be labelled
as malicious or benign, and thus can not serve as training data.
• Store generated mutations. The final step after determining whether
a mutation is malicious or benign is to store it accordingly. This builds
up the training data set of labelled mutations that later will be fed into
the training stage.
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7.2.2 Architecture
The high-level architecture consists of three machines connected in series, as
shown in Figure 7.1. Machine A is the attacker from which the original worm
is launched and machine C is the worm’s target. Machine B sits between
machines A and C and acts as a transparent proxy that mutates worms.
A typical cycle in this architecture looks as follows:
1. Machine A launches the original worm at machine C
2. Machine B intercepts the worm by reassembling the packets in the flow
3. Machine B randomly mutates the intercepted worm
4. Machine B forwards the mutation to machine C
5. Machine B queries machine C whether the attack succeeded
6. Machine B stores the mutation if the attack succeeded
The worm model introduced in Section 4.1 defined a worm mutation as a
worm that exploits the same vulnerability as the original worm, but executes
a different payload upon successful infiltration. Thus an attack of random
mutation will only succeed if the mutation alters the executable payload
without affecting either the application specific data (which is required to
successfully transport the worm) or the exploit (which is required to infiltrate
the target). Only successful attacks will be labelled as malicious.
The random mutation generator is an attractive extension over the struc-
tural mutation generator since it offers a fully automated method to gener-
ating worm mutations. While the structural mutation requires knowledge
about the worm’s structure – in particular the location of its payload – the
random mutation generator treats worms as black boxes and requires no such
prior knowledge. The experiments in this chapter will tell whether the ran-
dom mutations can match their structural counterparts in serving as high
quality training data.
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Figure 7.1: How the worm mutation generator fits into the over-
all worm detection architecture. The worm mutation adds a pre-
learning phase that generates the training data (top) for the learn-
ing phase (middle).
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Figure 7.2: Gauging the mutation degree. A high mutation
probability and small chunk size (top) yields fine-grained muta-
tions. A large chunk size and low mutation probability (bottom)
produces more coarse-grained mutations.
7.3 Experiment design
The experiments will test the quality of the worms generated by the worm
mutation generator in two parts: first for the structurally mutated worms
and second for the randomly mutated worms.
To challenge the classifier, the benign mutations closely resembled their
malicious counterparts except that they were disarmed of the exploit code.
In the case of the WarFTP worm, for example, the benign trace consists
of an FTP file transfer of the executable payload, minus the exploit code.
Similarly, for Minishare the executable payload was uploaded to the file shar-
ing repository without launching it. For Distcc the benign traces remotely
compile the source code but do not execute it.
For the random mutation generator, the experiments will test the im-
pact of the mutation degree on classifier accuracy. Two parameters control
the mutation degree: the mutation probability and the mutation chunk size
(Figure 7.2). Thinking of the traffic as an array of bytes b, the mutation
probability determines whether an intercepted byte bi should be mutated.
The mutation chunk size n then controls how many of the subsequent bytes
bi, bi+1, . . . , bi+n−1 will be mutated. The experiments will investigate the im-
pact of both the mutation probability and the mutation chunk size on clas-
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sifier accuracy.
7.3.1 Isolated testing network
Due to the hazardous nature of worms the experiments were conducted in
an isolated testing network. This network consists of three machines inter-
connected via a hub1: (i) a client machine from which attacks are launched,
(ii) a server machine that runs the vulnerable software, and (iii) a machine
hosting the forwarding proxy, which sits between the attacker and the tar-
get, intercepting traffic between the two. This setup derives directly from
the architecture described in Section 7.2.2.
The machines used were AMD Athlon XP 2200 with 1 GB of physical
memory. The target machine was a dual boot system running Ubuntu Linux
7.04 and Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 1. The reason for using a
dated Windows version was that it is known to contain many security holes,
and as such offers an ideal breeding ground for the worm mutations. The
other two machines ran Ubuntu Linux 7.04.
7.3.2 Implementation of a worm testing framework
In addition to the hardware setup described above, the experiments were
driven by a custom-built distributed worm testing framework. This frame-
work, implemented in Ruby, automates the execution of the experiments by
providing a central interface from which to (i) reset the testbed, (ii) select
an attack type, (iii) launch the attack, and (iv) verify whether the infection
was successful.
The framework’s distributed components map directly to the hardware
setup in the previous section and therefore consist of an attacker, a target,
and a forwarding proxy. These components run as agents on their hardware
counterparts using the Distributed Ruby API [110], and are remotely co-
ordinated by a central controller. The controller conducts the following event
1Note that a hub was used rather than an Ethernet switch since hubs forward traffic
on all ports thereby allowing communications to be tapped.
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Figure 7.3: Worm testing framework. Agent interaction during an
attack cycle.
sequence (Figure 7.3 shows the interaction of the agents for the first 5 steps):
1. Select a worm and arm the attacker with this worm
2. Launch the vulnerable service on the target
3. Start the forwarding proxy and recording the flow
4. Launch the attack
5. Query whether the target was successfully infected
6. Store the mutated flow under malicious or benign
7. Stop recording the flow and reset the target host
The central controller can sit on either of the three machines, or on a ded-
icated machine. For convenience, the experiments run the controller on the
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forwarding proxy machine. Each worm attack is encapsulated in a dedicated
class with the command design pattern [113].
For structurally mutated worms the proxy simply records the traffic flows
and then transparently forwards them to the target. For randomly generated
worms the proxy additionally randomly mutates bytes with a given proba-
bility as discussed in the outset of this Section.
The forwarding proxy uses sockets in a modified version of port proxy [114].
Sockets offer an attractive solution since they deal with the TCP flow’s
contents directly, freeing the mutation generator from having to reassemble
flows2. A drawback of the sockets approach is that the ports under attack
must be known in advance since they can only bind to fixed ports. While
this is adequate for the controlled environment of this chapter’s experiments,
it poses a restriction for production use. A workaround is to accept con-
nections from all ports, which could be implemented with an open source
routing gateway package such as the Click modular router [115].
The querying of the target is implemented by having the worm emit its
unique ID to a log file. For the Distcc worm this is easily implemented
with an echo command in the shell command sequence that is part of the
executable payload. For Minishare, which carries compiled C programs as its
executable payload, writing to the log file is achieved by injecting fprintf
statements into the programs’ source code. WarFTP, which carries binary
executables for which source code is not available, achieves this by wrapping
the executables in another executable that emits an fprintf before launching
the wrapped executable. The wrapper is a simple C program that embeds
the executable as a hex string generated by the xxd Unix utility.
7.3.3 Structurally mutated worms
Key experiments from the previous two chapters are repeated using struc-
turally mutated worms. In particular, the accuracy of Support Vector Ma-
chines, Gaussian Processes, and K-nearest neighbours at various training
2Flows would have to be reassembled manually if a packet capturing library such as
libpcap [88] were used.
CHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 111
data sizes is compared for each of the worms.
A data set of 400 mutations was created for each worm. As in previous
experiments, half of these were malicious and the other half benign. Var-
ious training data sizes were investigated by selecting an equal number of
malicious and benign mutations as training data, and selecting 100 of the
remaining mutations (again half malicious and half benign) as test data. Ex-
periments were repeated 50 times to obtain averages and standard deviations.
For Distcc, mutations were created by substituting the source code file
that is uploaded and executed with typical C tutorial programs. As such the
Distcc worm mutations carry a small payload with an average trace size of
1.7KB at a standard deviation of 1.1. The exploit size is 0.3KB, resulting in
an average data-to-signature ratio of 5.7:1
Structural mutations of the Minishare worm were created by substituting
the executable payload with small binary executables. For this the set of C
tutorial programs from the Distcc worm was compiled, resulting in an average
trace size of 8.4KB and a standard deviation of 1.7. Given an exploit size of
2.2KB, this yields a low average data-signature-ratio of 3.8:1.
WarFTP structural mutations were created by substituting the executable
payloads with exemplar Windows executables. The average trace size was
82.4KB with standard deviation of 55.2. With an exploit size of 1KB,
WarFTP has the highest average data-to-signature ratio of the three worms
with 82.4:1. The experiments will show how well the classifier can cope with
such a high data-to-signature ratio.
7.3.4 Randomly mutated worms
These experiments compare classifiers trained with the structurally mutated
worms from the previous section with classifiers trained with randomly gen-
erated worm mutations. To allow for a fair comparison, the training data
for the latter consists solely of randomly generated mutations, while the test
data consists of the same structurally mutated worms and benign data used
in the previous section.
The experiments for the random mutation generator require a source
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Figure 7.4: Structurally mutated Distcc worm. Accuracy
vs. training data size for Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Pro-
cesses, and K-nearest neighbours.
from which random mutations are generated. For each of the three worms
the source worm was selected to be as close to the average size as possible.
7.4 Analysis
The analysis follows the structure of the experiment design. First the results
of repeating key experiments from the previous two chapters on structurally
mutated worm mutations are presented and discussed. The best performing
machine learning technique is then used to test the random mutations and
the two results are compared.
7.4.1 Effectiveness of structurally mutated worms
This section looks at the results for the Distcc, Minishare and WarFTP worm
mutations in
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Figure 7.5: Structurally mutated Minishare worm. Accu-
racy vs. training data size for Support Vector Machines, Gaussian
Processes, and K-nearest neighbours.
7.4.1.1 Distcc worm
Figure 7.4 compares the accuracy of Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Pro-
cesses, and K-nearest neighbours on the Distcc worm. The graph shows that
the accuracy increases for Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes
up to a training data size of 50, after which the accuracy levels off. For
training data sizes below 20, K-nearest neighbours lags not too far behind
Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes, while showing consider-
ably less accuracy for higher training data sizes.
As in the previous chapter, Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Pro-
cesses achieve similar high accuracy for training data sizes above 50, peaking
at 98% accuracy. For training data sizes below 50, Support Vector Machines
perform noticeably better than Gaussian Processes.
7.4.1.2 Minishare worm
Figure 7.5 compares Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes, and K-
nearest neighbours on structural Minishare mutations. As for the Distcc
CHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 114
 55
 60
 65
 70
 75
 80
 85
 90
 95
 100
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
Training data size
SVM
GP
KNN
Figure 7.6: Structurally mutated WarFTP worm. Accuracy
vs. training data size for Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Pro-
cesses, and K-nearest neighbours.
mutations, classification accuracy increases with training data size for Sup-
port Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes.
The rise in accuracy is considerably steeper for Support Vector Machines
and Gaussian Processes than with Distcc, climbing to near 100% accuracy
for training data sizes as low as 10. The steep rise suggests that the training
stage is able to detect a pattern sooner than for Distcc, the most likely
explanation being the lower data-to-signature ratio.
As with Distcc, Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes perform
similarly well except for very small training data sizes. K-nearest neighbours
performs worse altogether, hitting a maximum of just over 60% accuracy.
7.4.1.3 WarFTP worm
Figure 7.6 compares Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes, and K-
nearest neighbours for structural WarFTP mutations. Compared to the
Distcc and Minishare results, the climb in accuracy for increasing training
data size is more gradual, indicating that the larger data-to-signature ratio
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makes it more difficult to extract a distinguishing pattern.
Of the three worms, WarFTP achieves the lowest maximum accuracy for
Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes, peaking at around 95%.
Again the most probable explanation is the high data-to-signature ratio. The
accuracy for K-nearest neighbours is considerably worse, consistently tailing
SVMs and GPs by around 25% from training data sizes larger than 50.
As with Distcc and Minishare, Support Vector Machines and Gaussian
Processes perform comparably.
7.4.1.4 Discussion
In summary, the results of the structural worm mutation experiments showed
that:
• As with synthetic worms, Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Pro-
cesses show higher classification accuracy than K-nearest neighbours
• Classification accuracy depends on the data-to-signature ratio, with
smaller data-to-signature ratios leading to higher accuracy
The results in this section have set the bar for the randomly mutated
worms investigated in the next section. The results obtained for the three
worms used in this section will now be compared directly to results obtained
using training data sets generated by the random worm mutation generator.
7.4.2 Effectiveness of randomly mutated worms
Are the randomly mutated worm mutations suitable as training data for
the machine learning classifiers? This section attempts to answer this ques-
tion by comparing classifiers trained with randomly mutated worms to those
trained with structurally mutated worms from the previous section. Based
on the results of the previous section, the results in this section will base its
comparison on Support Vector Machines.
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Figure 7.7: Randomly mutated Distcc worm. Prediction Ac-
curacy vs training data size for classifiers trained of the randomly
mutated Distcc worm. Mutation probability was 0.005 with a
chunk size of 300 bytes.
7.4.2.1 Distcc worm
Figure 7.7 compares the prediction accuracy of the structural mutations with
random mutations of the Distcc worm. The results are promising, and show
that classifiers trained with random mutations match that of structural mu-
tations up to training data sizes of 10, topping at 90% accuracy for training
data size 20.
For training data sizes greater than 20 accuracy drops, most likely due
to overfitting. Recall that the random mutations are generated from the
same source worm, and for larger training data sizes the training phase could
falsely pick up parts of the source code as being part of the exploit code,
especially if those parts have not been mutated by the random byte mutator.
7.4.2.2 Minishare worm
The results of the Minishare worm show a different trend to Distcc, but are
equally encouraging. Accuracy increases steadily for the random mutations
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Figure 7.8: Randomly mutated Minishare worm. Prediction
Accuracy vs training data size for classifiers trained with generated
Minishare worm mutations. Mutation probability was 0.005 with
a chunk size of 250 bytes.
with increasing training data size, but less gradually than the structural
mutations, suggesting that the training stage requires a larger spectrum of
random mutations than structural mutations to detect a common pattern.
The classifier reaches an encouraging maximum accuracy of 95% for ran-
dom mutations, just 5% below that of structural mutations.
7.4.2.3 WarFTP worm
Figure 7.9 shows the results for the WarFTP worm. Out of the three worms
investigated, this worm proved the most difficult for the classifiers, achieving
the lowest accuracy for classifiers trained with random mutations of just 55%
accuracy for smaller training sizes.
The most likely explanation for this poor result is both the high data-
to-signature ratio (82.4:1) and the large standard deviation of the average
payload size (standard deviation 55.2 for an average payload size of 82.4KB).
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Figure 7.9: Randomly mutated WarFTP worms. Prediction
Accuracy vs training data size for classifiers trained with generated
WarFTP worm mutations. Mutation probability was 0.0001 with
a chunk size of 1000 bytes.
7.4.2.4 Varying the mutation degree
The previous experiments kept the mutation degree fixed for each worm.
Figure 7.10 analyses the impact of varying the number of bytes mutated,
showing that accuracy increases as more bytes are mutated. Similarly Fig-
ure 7.11 analyses the impact of varying the mutation probability, showing
that accuracy increases with higher mutation probability.
Combined, the results suggest that a higher mutation degree leads to a
better trained classifier, as expected. As more bytes are mutated, the training
phase is able to narrow down the common pattern onto the exploit code.
7.4.2.5 Discussion
The results of the randomly mutated worms were encouraging. Especially
the Minishare experiments have shown that the random worm mutation gen-
erator is suitable to generate training data for machine learning classifiers,
albeit with less overall accuracy than for structural mutations
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Figure 7.10: Impact of mutation chunk size (with a fixed prob-
ability of 0.005, and training data size of 20) on the prediction
accuracy of randomly mutated Distcc worms.
Unusual about the Distcc results was that accuracy dropped for larger
training sizes. Of the three worms, Distcc was the only one with a payload
in source code form rather than as a binary executable, hinting that the
classifier is prone to overfit purely-text based random mutations.
The results of the WarFTP worm were, however, less encouraging: with
an accuracy of 55%, the classifier was little more than guessing the predic-
tions. The poor results could be the result of the high data-to-signature
ratio (82.4:1). By comparison, Distcc has a data-to-signature ratio of 5.7:1
but achieves 90% accuracy, while Minishare achieves up to 95% accuracy
with a data-to-signature ratio of 3.8:1.
Gauging the mutation degree showed that accuracy improves as more
bytes are mutated. However, the trade-off here is time. For example, with a
mutation probability of 0.01 and a chunk size of 100 bytes, Distcc yielded a
malicious mutation every 25 mutation cycles. Given that a random mutation
cycle in the worm testing framework takes around 9 seconds to complete, the
total time to build a training data size of, say, 100 malicious mutations is
just over 6 hours.
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Figure 7.11: Impact of mutation probability (with a fixed chunk
size of 100 bytes, and training data size of 20) on the prediction
accuracy of randomly mutated Distcc worms.
7.5 Summary
This chapter flagged the need to automatically generate worm mutations to
serve as training data for machine learning classifiers due to the lack of worm
mutations in the wild. In particular, this chapter investigated:
• How to generate training data. Described the design, implemen-
tation and deployment of a worm mutation generator to handle this
automation in two ways: structurally mutating worms by programati-
cally replacing executable payloads, and randomly mutating worms by
altering their byte streams arbitrarily.
• Effectiveness of generated structural mutations. Evaluated the
structural mutation generator of the machine learning algorithms (Sup-
port Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes, and K-nearest neighbours)
by repeating the key experiments of the previous chapter. The results
showed that the quality of the generated structural mutations are suf-
ficiently high to serve as training data.
CHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 121
• Effectiveness of generated random mutations. Compared ran-
dom mutations to structural mutations using Support Vector Machines.
The results showed that for Distcc and Minishare the quality of the ran-
dom mutations is also sufficiently high to serve as training data, with
the added bonus that they require no prior knowledge about the worm.
To conclude, this chapter has shown that using the worm mutation generator
is a viable option for generating training data.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Discussion
The worm problem affects us all. Today’s news is filled with stories about
spam flooding the Internet, phishing sites relieving people of their savings,
Trojans harvesting sensitive information for identity theft, and worms cloak-
ing as benign network traffic to sneak past firewalls and wreaking havoc.
Many network intrusion detection systems [43, 42, 14, 47, 53, 54] have
been written to protect both private users and large organisations, but no
matter how frequently the software is updated, it always seems to lag one step
behind worm authors. This dissertation has the ambitious goal of not just
levelling the playing field but to turn it upside down – to leverage the power
of machine learning to automatically detect mutations of known worms.
Detecting worms has often been likened to finding a needle in a haystack.
Machine learning [56, 57, 58], and in a larger context artificial intelligence,
have long been hailed for their successes in recognising patterns [15, 66, 67],
and it is this power that this dissertation attempts to harness.
Conceptually, by feeding machine learning techniques a training set, ma-
chine learning techniques are able to find distinguishing features in the train-
ing data that enables them to classify unknown data. The approach of this
dissertation was to build an intrusion detection system that is fed both worm
(malicious) traffic and normal (benign) traffic as training data, so that it can
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automatically filter worm mutations out of everyday network traffic.
The past years have witnessed rapid growth and advances in the field
of machine learning, and so one of the key decisions of this dissertation was
which machine learning algorithm to use. Of all machine learning techniques,
Support Vector Machines [15] have risen to prominence since the 1990’s.
The popularity of Support Vector Machines is not unfounded: they have
successfully been applied to a large number of real-world pattern recognition
problems including categorisation [66], image classification [67], and hand-
written character recognition [15].
With such a good track record of detecting patterns, can Support Vec-
tor Machines find that proverbial needle in the haystack? Answering this
question was the task of the first part of this dissertation, with encourag-
ing results: the classifier reached 99% accuracy for the most common worm
data-to-signature ratio of 25:11. Even more encouraging was that Support
Vector Machines are resilient to a fair degree of distortion, a popular tech-
nique with worm authors to cloak their worms. The results also suggest
that Support Vector Machines could detect polymorphic worms [116], which
bypass conventional intrusion detection systems by mutating themselves at
each network hop.
The solid results for Support Vector Machines in detecting worms raised
additional questions addressed by this dissertation: how do other machine
learning techniques fare in detecting worm mutations? Can the results of
Support Vector Machines be bettered by other popular machine learning
techniques? The second part of this dissertation was devoted to answer-
ing these questions by comparing Support Vector Machines with Gaussian
Processes [16] and K-nearest neighbours [17].
Gaussian Processes have a theoretical edge over Support Vector Machines
in that they return a confidence measure with their classification, which
a secondary classifier (for example a human) could leverage to potentially
1Interestingly, worm authors strive for a highly compact executable payload for faster
spreading, effectively reducing the data-to-signature. The results show that the smaller the
data-to-signature ratio, the higher the accuracy of the classifier. Conversely, a less skilled
worm author who produces larger code might make it more difficult on the classifier.
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reduce the number of false alarms. K-nearest neighbours, being a very simple
and intuitive algorithm, offered another angle on how good the results of
Support Vector Machines really were.
Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes were close rivals, with
Support Vector Machines achieving a few percent points higher accuracy
than Gaussian Processes, on average. While Support Vector Machines and
Gaussian Processes proved to be a close call, K-nearest neighbours was out-
performed by both Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes, and
that despite the number of neighbours being tuned to the training data size.
Comparing Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes and, to a lesser
extent also K-nearest neighbours, underlined that training data size is piv-
otal to the success of detecting worm mutations. This poses a challenge for
deploying such classifiers in the real-world: the number of worm mutation
traces in the wild is limited, potentially starving such a classifier of its key
resource needed to detect worms.
The mission of the third and final part of this dissertation, then, was to
find a way to secure the vital training data that fuels the classifiers. The
result was a worm mutation generator that automatically generates worm
mutations in two ways: (i) structurally mutating a source worm by replacing
its executable payload, and, (ii) randomly mutating chunks of its trace. The
results showed that the quality of the generated structural worm mutations
were of high quality, suitable to serve as training data. The random worm
mutations showed encouraging results as well, generating good quality train-
ing data for the two of the three worms investigated, with the important
added bonus that they require no prior knowledge of the worm aside from
being in possession of a known, lethal trace of the original worm.
This dissertation achieved its ambitious goal of putting network intrusion
detection systems one step ahead of worm authors by automatically detect-
ing worm mutations. It has laid the groundwork to yield a powerful weapon
against the worm threat: a network intrusion detection system armed with a
Support Vector Machine classifier, fed by the worm mutation generator with
training data. This system should be powerful and accurate enough to au-
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tomatically detect mutations of worms with little to no human intervention.
This dissertation has laid a solid foundation, and the next chapter will look
at how this solid foundation can be further extended.
8.2 Contributions
This work contributes to the defence against computer worms in the following
ways:
• Feasibility of Support Vector Machines in detecting worm mu-
tations. A thorough investigation into the feasibility of using machine
learning based pattern recognition techniques to detect worm muta-
tions was conducted. In particular, the optimal configuration of Sup-
port Vector Machines, including choice of kernel, n-gram extraction
size, and training data sizes was investigated. The resilience to signa-
ture mutations and signature corruption, as well as the ability to cope
with mixed data-to-signature ratios, was also investigated.
• Comparison of alternative machine learning techniques in de-
tecting worm mutations. Support Vector Machines were compared
to two alternative machine learning techniques, Gaussian Processes and
K-nearest neighbours, with regards to how effectively they detect worm
mutations. The results demonstrated that Support Vector Machines
show slightly higher accuracy than Gaussian Processes, while K-nearest
neighbours perform considerably worse. Gaussian Processes return a
confidence value with their predictions, and this confidence was shown
to offer a practical guide when the classifier is uncertain.
• Automatically generating training data. A worm mutation gen-
erator was developed in order to overcome the problem of limited avail-
ability of training data in the wild. The results confirmed the encour-
aging results from the previous chapters, as well as that training data
for the machine leaning techniques can be generated using structural
and, to a lesser degree, random mutation strategies.
Chapter 9
Future work
This dissertation has successfully shown that machine learning techniques are
suitable for detecting worm mutations. Yet this is just the beginning. The
machine learning techniques explored in this dissertation must now prove
themselves in the real world, and this opens some interesting and exciting
opportunities for future work.
This chapter looks into some of these opportunities: defending against
sophisticated worm attack strategies, designing a custom kernel, alternative
feature representation, real-time detection, online training, cascading classi-
fiers, and scaling the infrastructure.
9.1 Sophisticated worm attack strategies
Worm authors often go to great lengths to maximise the potency and lethality
of their worms. This has led to highly sophisticated attack strategies, which
begs the question how robust the approach proposed in this work is to such
strategies. This section describes some of these attack strategies and discusses
how the work of this dissertation could be made more robust against such
attacks.
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9.1.1 Polymorphic blending attack
As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, polymorphic worms are worms that mutate
themselves in such a way that their signature changes at every hop when
traversing a network. Anomaly detection systems, by their nature of search-
ing for anomalies rather than intrusions, lend themselves well to the detection
of polymorphic worms.
An attack strategy that takes polymorphic worms to the next level are
polymorphic blending attacks [117]. These attacks essentially consist of poly-
morphic worms that not only mutate from hop to hop, but also mutate in
such a way that they blend in with normal traffic. Polymorphic blending
attacks have been shown to successfully evade byte frequency based anomaly
detection systems by morphing in such a way that their extracted features
blend with normal traffic [117].
Since the approach advocated by this work uses n-gram based feature
extraction, it is possible that it would be bypassed by polymorphic blending
attacks. Consequently it would be interesting to investigate how the mecha-
nism proposed in this work copes with polymorphic blending attacks, and to
ascertain whether alternative feature representations such as those discussed
in Section 9.3 improve the performance.
9.1.2 Zero day vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities are typically discovered months before worms that exploit
them are released. It is possible, however, that a worm author discovers a
previously undisclosed vulnerability and releases a worm on the same day.
Such worms are known as zero day worms. This dissertation focuses on
detecting mutations of known worms and as such will not be capable of
detecting worms on which it has not been trained, whether they are zero day
worms or not.
However, classifiers in this dissertation are built using training data that
contains both benign and malicious flows, and the classifiers learn to distin-
guish between the two classes. Using a confidence measure, such as provided
by Gaussian Processes, it may be possible to flag new and unknown flows for
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further investigation. This mechanism could be used to defend against zero
day exploits.
9.1.3 Poisoning of benign traffic
A form of attack that has been shown to fool automatic signature generators,
such as Polygraph [48], is to poison benign traffic by deliberately injecting
well-crafted noise [118]. This poisoning can be accomplished by sending
out an instance of benign traffic for every instance of malicious traffic. For
example, for every attack of a vulnerable service, a worm could also perform
a benign request to that service, which includes the exploit code, with the
only difference that the exploit will not be executed.
By poisoning the benign traffic, it becomes increasingly difficult to dis-
tinguish between malicious and benign flows. The problem is that signature
generators are at their most vulnerable in the training phase. The same is
true for machine learning based classifiers: if given mislabelled training data
they will not be able to build a good classifier.
This dissertation builds on the assumption that training data is correctly
labelled and has not been deliberately poisoned. It would be interesting
to investigate how susceptible machine learning is to poisoned traffic, and,
if found to be highly susceptible, how the classifiers could be made more
robust. A way to carry out this investigation is to feed the training stage
with deliberately mislabelled data, for example labelling 5% of the benign
data as malicious.
9.2 Designing a custom kernel
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, a kernel conceptually measures the similarity
between two data points in a given feature space. Kernels such as the RBF
kernel deal with non-linearly separable data by implicitly mapping the data
to a higher dimensional feature space. As such, the accuracy of the classifier
depends on how suitable the feature space can represent the data at hand.
For cases where the feature space cannot readily represent the data, the
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focus of recent work was to build a custom kernel [119, 71, 120]. Indeed,
the string kernel [71] used in this dissertation is a custom kernel originally
designed to categorise text documents, with good results that closely rivalled
the linear and RBF kernels but did not match their classification times (Sec-
tion 5.3.2.6).
Left for future work is the development of a custom, more discriminatory
kernel based on the model of the structural and random byte mutation gener-
ators. This could take into account the degree of mutation, data-to-signature
ratios and training data size, as well as cater natively for split, jumbled and
corrupted signatures. A guide to constructing kernels is given in [56].
9.3 Alternative feature representation
As discussed in Section 4.4, this dissertation uses n-grams to extract fea-
tures for the linear and RBF kernels. The findings of Section 5.3.3.1 suggest
that bi-grams offer superior performance over tri-grams at only marginally
less accuracy. This dissertation side-stepped values n > 3 because the num-
ber of features and hence memory requirements grow exponentially with n.
However, higher values of n could improve the classifier’s accuracy, and in-
vestigating how accuracy is affected by larger n will be insightful.
To be practically feasible, higher values of n must be approximated. One
approximation technique are 2v-grams suggested by Perdisci et al [52] as
an improvement over PayL [50], two network intrusion detection systems
outlined in Section 2.2.2. 2v-grams approximate higher numbers of n by
using a sliding window of size v + 2 when traversing the data. The idea is
to extract information about higher n-grams (n > 2) by measuring only the
occurrence frequency of byte pairs that are v bytes apart in the flow.
An advantage of 2v-grams is that they work well with sophisticated at-
tack strategies such as polymorphic blending attacks, where normal bi-grams
perform poorly [52]. On the downside, however, 2v-grams are still prone to
the curse of dimensionality, although Perdisci et al [52] suggest to reduce the
feature space by a feature clustering algorithm. Note that 2v-grams are a
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generalisation of n-grams; for v = 0 the technique degenerates to standard
bi-grams.
Another alternative approximation technique is Content-based Payload
Partitioning as used by Autograph [47] and Earlybird [14], both discussed in
Section 2.2.2. This technique divides the payload into variable length blocks
by computing Rabin fingerprints [121] over a sliding window, with the sliding
window stopping when a predefined Rabin fingerprint is matched.
Rabin fingerprints can be efficiently computed over sliding windows [121],
and have been shown to be robust to byte insertions, deletions and replace-
ments [47] – common cloaking techniques by worm authors. However, Rabin
fingerprints sometimes generate very short blocks, yielding unspecific fea-
tures and consequently a high number of false alarms. At the other extreme,
Rabin fingerprints may match the entire flow payload, leading to long signa-
tures that are unsuitable for detecting worms. The workaround suggested in
Autograph [47] is to impose maximum and minimum block lengths.
9.4 Real-time detection
In this dissertation, the machine learning classifiers enjoyed the comforts of
a lab environment where the focus was accuracy rather than speed, but to
compete in the real world they need to meet strict real-time requirements.
This section outlines how real-time performance can be improved by (a) opti-
mising flow reassembly, (b) partial flow classification, (c) dedicated hardware,
and (d) reducing the memory footprint.
9.4.1 Optimising flow reassembly
The approach taken by this work is to detect worms in reassembled flows
since this ensures that worms can be scanned in their entirety, even if they
are divided into several, potentially reordered, packets. The machine learning
classifier thus sits at the top of the network stack, freed from worrying about
packets and seeing the network traffic simply as a continuous byte stream
that it can match to its training data.
CHAPTER 9. FUTURE WORK 131








Figure 9.1: Real-time flow reassembly using a circular buffer. The
circular buffer keeps track of two regions by way of three pointers:
(i) a sequence of unprocessed packets, and (ii) packets that the flow
analyser has requested to retain. Keeping the retained packets in
the buffer as long as possible avoids spilling them to the heap.
However, this may break strict real-time requirements if deployed in high
speed locations with immense traffic volumes, such as border gateways in
university campuses and large corporations. There is significant overhead
involved in copying data packets between physical memories, such as from
the network card to main memory, as well as copying memory between kernel
and user level. Typically, when dealing with line-rate classification, dedicated
hardware enables working off the network interface’s memory directly, rather
than resorting to copying packets into main memory.
The impact of real-time flow reassembly and possible ways of achieving it
on high speed network links was presented in [90]. Real-time flow reassembly
in [90] is accomplished through the use of special-purpose network capturing
interfaces and a circular buffer, several hundred megabytes large, as shown in
Figure 9.1. The system fills the buffer and in parallel reassembles the flows
directly from the buffer, thereby avoiding expensive memory copies.
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Figure 9.2: Partial flow classification
9.4.2 Partial flow classification
Besides possibly breaking real-time requirements, another disadvantage of
scanning fully reassembled flows is that the worm’s attack cycle must be
completed, allowing the entire flow to be reassembled, before the machine
learning classifiers begin their detection. By the time a malicious flow has
been reassembled, passed to the classifier and categorised by the classifier,
the worm may have already infiltrated the host.
A logical solution is to initiate classification when the first packets arrive
on the wire, rather than waiting for the flow to be reassembled in its entirety.
Figure 9.2 suggests how such on-the-fly classification could work in practice.
The idea is to continuously classify flows while they are being reassembled
and to use the confidence measure (as provided by Gaussian Processes) to
determine whether the information seen so far is sufficient to label the flow
as malicious or benign.
On-the-fly classification offers challenging opportunities for future work.
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What is the optimal confidence threshold? What is the average number of
packets required to make a sufficiently accurate classification? And, most
importantly, can partial classification accuracy match that of full flow clas-
sification? Exploring such questions will be an interesting addition to this
work.
9.4.3 Dedicated hardware
A further possibility worthy of investigation is to improve real-time perfor-
mance by running the classifier (in whole or in part) on dedicated hardware.
To be effective, the dedicated hardware should sit as close as possible to
the network hardware, such as border routers and gateways, preferably even
share the same physical memory so that network flows can be examined
instantly.
The dedicated hardware could take the form of a custom-designed inte-
grated circuit (IC) chip, which offers the maximum possible performance.
On the downside, a classifier fully hardwired into a circuit will be hard to
upgrade, tune and debug. Greater flexibility, albeit at a slight performance
cost, could be gained by using configurable hardware such as that provided
by NetFPGA [122].
9.4.4 Reducing the memory footprint
As mentioned in Section 4.4.2, even with bi-gram extraction a feature vector
consists of 65, 536 entries, possibly straining the available memory resources
for a large number of flows in a real-time environment. Future work could
investigate reducing the memory footprint, for example using the following
methods:
• Feature selection. This involves selectively removing features from
the feature space and repeating the experiments to see if the accuracy
can be maintained without the removed features. Libsvm ships with a
tool that performs this selective feature removal [123].
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• Sparse matrices. Instead of storing all entries of the feature vector
in an array, only the non-zero items could be stored in a sparse repre-
sentation. Libsvm offers the option to store feature vectors as dense or
sparse matrices [98].
9.5 Online training
The machine learning classifiers used in this work separated training and
classification not just by function but also by time: training is done oﬄine
and the results fed to the classifier for online use. As it stands, the only way
to update the classifier is to train a new classifier oﬄine in the background
and hotswapping it in when ready.
Retraining the classifier online offers the advantage of being able to contin-
uously improve classifiers while they are in operation, potentially improving
their accuracy. The basic approach is to keep training classifiers incremen-
tally with fresh training data, as for example shown in [124]. Incremental
learning raises a number of intriguing questions for future work:
• Should the fresh training data be added when new training data is
available, or should the training data be collected and bundled before
updating the classifier? If bundled, what bundle size will yield the best
speed-accuracy trade-off?
• Should fresh training data (bundled or not) be added as soon as it is
available, or only when the system is under light load? Is it possible to
add the training data without risking that worms slip past during the
update?
• How does legacy data affect the classifier’s speed and accuracy? Can
legacy data be phased out as fresh training data is phased in?
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Figure 9.3: Manual analysis in uncertain cases.
9.6 Cascading classifiers
As a stand-alone classifier, Support Vector Machines have consistently per-
formed more accurately than Gaussian Processes throughout this disserta-
tion. At the same time, the confidence measure returned by Gaussian Pro-
cesses has been shown to be a valuable tool since it offers another angle on the
classification – it can be flagged for further processing when the confidence
is low.
It would thus be interesting to investigate how accurately a chain of clas-
sifiers performs with Gaussian Processes as the primary classifier, handing
off to a secondary classifier in cases of uncertainty. What are possible can-
didates for the secondary classifier? Two possible options are a) to involve a
human operator to manually analyse the prediction, and b) to hand off fur-
ther analysis to a refined machine learning classifier that is slower but more
accurate.
9.6.1 Manual analysis
A possibility is to transfer control to a manual analysis stage where a human
operator examines the flow. The manual analysis stage could be used both
as a last resort if all else fails, and as a reinforcement mechanism for the
machine learning algorithms in the early stages when the training data is
still fresh.
CHAPTER 9. FUTURE WORK 136
Figure 9.4: Adding new training data in manual analysis.
How might an interface for a human operator look? When the classifier
is uncertain about it’s classification, the human analysis stage is notified
and prompts the operator as in Figure 9.3. The operator can then decide
whether to accept the classification, ignore it or view details. The details of
the worm mutation could be displayed in tcpdump format augmented with
flow statistics, such as byte frequency distributions, for the human operator
to make an informed decision.
The operator’s input affects the accuracy of future predictions. If the
operator rejects the classification, then the system will be less confident upon
the next similar encounter. If the operator accepts the classification, the
system will be more confident.
After asking the operator the same question a number of times (say, 10
times), the system can prompt the operator as in Figure 9.4. The operator
can then decide whether the system should continue to prompt him, perform
the action automatically, or add the discovered mutation to the database.
Adding the signature to the database triggers the machine learning technique
to retrain its classifiers.
9.6.2 Refined machine learning analysis
Rather than introducing a human operator into the loop, another option is
to use an automated, more refined second machine learning classifier. This
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classifier is slower – based on the understanding that only a fraction of the
predictions by the Gaussian Processes will require further attention – but
must be more accurate than the primary Gaussian Processes classifier.
Which machine learning classifier meets these requirements for the sec-
ondary classifier? One possibility is to equip the secondary classifier with
a special-purpose kernel for detecting worm mutations, as outlined in Sec-
tion 9.2. Another possibility is to use a different feature representation such
as higher n-gram values, as discussed in Section 9.3.
9.7 Scalability
The approach taken by this dissertation is to build a binary classifier for a
single worm that determines whether a flow is a mutation of that worm. This
implies that a classifier must be built for each known worm. A question left
for future work is whether this system scales well with a large number of
worms, and if not, how the system can be made more scalable.
A potential option to increase scalability is to build multi-class classifiers
that can distinguish between more than two classes (worms). Gaussian Pro-
cesses, and K-nearest neighbours support multi-class classification natively,
while Support Vector Machines have to resort to workarounds such as one-
versus-rest [56]. It would be insightful to repeat the experiments in this
dissertation on popular SVM extensions for multi-class classification, such as
those compared in [100].
Another approach to scale the system is to build multiple binary classifiers
(that is, one for each worm) and distribute them over to multiple machines,
for example, one per classifier. There are a number of pitfalls when dis-
tributing to multiple machines, including but not restricted to unnecessary
and time-consuming copying of data between machines. Considerable care
must be taken that only necessary information flows between machines.
A lighter approach to distribute the system is to physically factor out the
training to dedicated machines that build classifiers and upload these to the
classification machines when ready.
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9.8 Summary
This chapter explored opportunities for future work:
• Defending against sophisticated worm attack strategies. Worm
authors often go to great lengths to ensure their worms evade detection,
for example by building polymorphic worms that mutate themselves
at each network hop, or by poisoning benign traffic with fake worms.
Future work could investigate how robust the machine learning classifier
is to such sophisticated worm attack strategies.
• Designing a custom kernel. A kernel measures the similarity be-
tween two data points in a given feature space, and as such the accuracy
of the classifier depends on how well the feature space can represent
the data at hand. Left for future work is the development of a custom,
more discriminatory kernel based on the model of the mutation gener-
ators. Future work can investigate whether such a custom kernel can
further improve the accuracy of this dissertation’s classifier.
• Alternative feature representation. This work investigated uni-
grams, bi-grams and tri-grams to extract features for the linear and
RBF kernels, but higher value n-grams could improve the classifier’s
accuracy further. Since the number of features grows exponentially
with n, this requires approximation techniques such as 2v-grams or
Content-based Payload Partitioning.
• Real-time detection. Future work can improve real-time perfor-
mance by a) optimising flow reassembly by directly accessing the net-
work interface’s physical memory, b) classifying worms with only par-
tially reassembled flows, and c) placing the classifier on dedicated hard-
ware such as custom-built integrated circuit boards or reconfigurable
hardware.
• Online training. This work’s machine learning classifiers perform
training oﬄine, meaning that when new training data arrives a new
classifier has to be built and hotswapped with the old classifier. Future
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work could investigate whether training the classifier online can fur-
ther improve its accuracy. A possible approach is incremental learning,
where the classifier is fed with new training data during live operation.
• Cascading classifiers. While the standalone Support Vector Ma-
chines has consistently performed more accurately than Gaussian Pro-
cesses, it would still be interesting to see how effectively Gaussian Pro-
cesses and its confidence value work in a chain of classifiers. Possible
candidates for the secondary classifier handling uncertain cases are a
human operator performing manual analysis, and a refined machine
learning classifier that is slower but more accurate.
• Scalability. A task open for future work is to investigate the scala-
bility of this work’s implementation for large numbers of worms. One
approach is to upgrade the binary classifier to a multi-class classifier.
Another approach is to distribute the system, for example by separat-
ing the training and classification stages onto two machines. A step
further is to distribute the system onto one machine per classifier.
Appendix A
Formulas of Support Vector
Machines
In its basic, linear form, Support Vector Machines is a hyperplane that max-
imises the distance to the support vectors in a training data set. The distance
of vector x to the hyperplane is given by:
u = !w · !x− b (A.1)
where w is the normal vector to the hyperplane. The separating hyperplane
is defined by u = 0, and the nearest points line on the planes which u = ±1.
Thus the margin m is
m =
1
||w||2 (A.2)
The problem of maximising the margin can be stated as an optimisation
problem [63]
min
1
2
||!w||2 subject to yi(!w · !x− b) ≥ 1,∀i (A.3)
where xi is the ith training data item and yi ∈ {1,−1} its corresponding label.
By applying a Lagrangian the optimisation problem can be converted into
a Quadratic Programming problem where the objective function Ψ depends
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solely on the Lagrange multiplier α:
min
!α
Ψ(!α) = !α
min
1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
yiyj(!xi · !xj)αiαj −
N∑
i=1
αi (A.4)
where N is the number of training data items. The Lagrangian is constrained
by the inequality
αi ≥ 0,∀i (A.5)
and the linear equality
N∑
i=1
yiαi = 0 (A.6)
The normal vector !w and the value of b can be calculated once the the
Lagrange multipliers have been found:
!w =
N∑
i=1
yiαi!xi, b = !w · !xk − yk for some αk > 0 (A.7)
For non-linearly separable data sets there will be no separating hyper-
plane, yielding an infinite solution in the above formula. Cortes and Vap-
nik [15] modified the optimization problem in Equation A.3 to allow (but
penalize) cases when no correct margin can be reached:
min
!w,b,!ξ
1
2
||!w||2 + C
N∑
i=1
ξi subject to yi(!w · !x− b) ≥ 1− ξi,∀i (A.8)
where ξi are slack variables that take into account margin errors, and the C
parameter is the softness of the margin – it trades off margin width with the
number of margin errors. Transforming the optimisation problem into dual
form changes the constraint in Equation A.4 into a box constraint:
0 ≤ αi ≤ C,∀i (A.9)
Appendix B
Receiver Operator
Characteristics Graphs
Receiver operator characteristics (ROC) [96] curve analysis presents a way
of quantifying the trade-off between the detection rate (true positives) and
the false alarm rate (false positives). ROC curves have their roots in signal
detection and medical decision-making, and have recently become a popu-
lar way of analysing machine learning classifiers. This chapter presents an
overview of ROC curve analysis, following [125].
B.1 ROC graphs
ROC graphs are a two-dimensional depiction of the accuracy of a signal
detector plotting the true positive (y-axis) rate against the false positive
rate (x-axis) respectively as shown in Figure B.1. The true positive rate is
calculated by dividing the number of true positives by the total number of
positives, and the false positive rate is calculated by dividing the number of
false positives by the total number of negatives.
These two rates change in relation to another. That is, when the true pos-
itive rate is high, the false positive rate will be low, and vice versa. Naturally
this means that these two rates can be equal somewhere in the middle.
The basic idea of ROC graphs is to provide a visualisation of the trade-off
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Figure B.1: Receiver operator characteristics (ROC) graph space
showing (i) the line of random performance, (ii) liberal and con-
servative regions, (iii) the point of perfect performance, and (iv)
the points of all positive and all negative classifications.
between the true and false positive rates, and hence an understanding of the
accuracy of a classifier.
There are several general areas of interest in a ROC graph, as illustrated
in Figure B.1. First, the diagonal dividing line that connects the bottom left
to the top right corner represents random performance (guessing). Points
that lie above this line are better than random and points below this line are
worse than random. In theory, for classifiers there should be no points below
this dividing line because classifiers that perform worse than random could
be mirrored into the top half by simply inverting their outputs.
The top half of this diagonal line can be further split in half with a
perpendicular line. The left half of this new division shows conservative
(higher true positive than false positive rates) classifiers, whereas the right
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Figure B.2: Receiver operator characteristics curves for various
performances.
half shows liberal (lower true positive than false positive rates) classifiers.
Classifiers in the conservative region make fewer false positive decisions,
with the extreme point being the bottom left corner which indicates a clas-
sifier that classifies all instances as negative. This means, on the one hand,
that it will not produce any false positives, but on the other hand, will not
produce true positives either.
In the liberal region classifiers exhibit a good true positive rate but com-
mit a significant amount of false positives. Again, with the extreme case
being the top right corner, which represents a classifier that marks every-
thing as true.
Finally, the point in the top left corner represents a perfect classifier.
This classifier has a 100% true positive rate and a 0% false positive rate.
This point can also be used as a reference point whereby other points on the
ROC graph can be ranked by their distance to it.
B.2 ROC curves
The true advantage of ROC graphs does not come from single point interpre-
tation, but from the ability to characterise a classifier’s performance model
as a curve. Figures B.2(a), B.2(b), and B.2(c), show the curves for an almost
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perfect classifiers, a good classifier, and a poor classifier respectively.
To aid the interpretation of ROC curves, it is important to understand
how they are constructed. Obtaining a single point in the ROC space from a
classifier is straightforward by simply calculating the true and false positive
rates for a classification. But how can a single run like this be transformed
into a curve?
Curves are obtained from classifiers that attach a probability or ranking
to each prediction. For each possible probability1 or ranking a point is plot-
ted in the ROC space. These points joined together form the ROC curve.
As with the ROC graph itself, the left half of the curve represents the classi-
fier’s performance under high (conservative) decision thresholds and the left
represents the classifiers performance under low (liberal) decision thresholds.
Curves can also be obtained for classifiers that do not yield a probability
or ranking with each prediction. One method is to obtain a confidence value
in an ad-hoc manner, such as calculating the distance to a SVM’s separating
hyperplane. Another way of obtaining an estimate is to sort the test set’s
individual classifications by their confidence values and then iterating over
these values, computing true and false positive rates for all classifications up
to and including the current value.
B.3 Area under curve
A single metric that can be obtained from these curves is the total area
under the curve (AUC) [97]. Classifiers with larger areas perform better, on
average, than classifiers with lower areas. Nevertheless, it is still possible for
classifiers with lower AUC’s to perform better than classifiers with higher
AUC’s for some regions of the graph.
1The default decision or probability threshold of classifiers is typically 0.5.
Glossary
Anomaly detection In intrusion detection, anomaly detection systems are
equipped with a model of normal traffic. The idea is to detect in-
trusions by searching for traffic that does not correspond with this
model.
Botnet A network of infected hosts that can be remote controlled to perform
potentially malicious tasks.
Data-to-signature ratio The amount of data (padding) relative to the size
of the signature.
Decision surface see separating hyperplane.
Distributions (mathematics): generalisation of functions and probability
distributions
False negative Erroneously classifying something as negative, for example,
erroneously classifying malicious data as benign.
False positive Erroneously classifying something as positive, for example,
erroneously classifying benign data as malicious.
Flow see TCP/IP flow.
Gaussian Processes A machine learning technique that yields similar re-
sults to Support Vector Machines, with the addition of returning a
confidence value as part of its result.
Hyperplane See separating hyperplane.
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Intrusion detection systems Intrusion detection systems are special pur-
pose monitoring systems that attempt to identify break-ins.
K-nearest Neighbours A simple machine learning technique that surpris-
ingly often performs well.
Kernel Conceptually, kernels equip machine learning techniques such as
Support Vector Machines, with the ability to map non-linearly sep-
arable data points into different dimensions where they are linearly
separable.
Linear kernel The standard SVM kernel that tries to find a dividing hyper-
plane by calculating the dot product on pattern vectors in the original
feature space.
Machine learning A sub-discipline of artificial intelligence and involves de-
veloping algorithms that allow computers to learn.
Misuse detection In intrusion detection, misuse detection systems are equipped
with models of known intrusions (or signatures). These models, known
as signatures, are used to identify intrusions by looking for matches in
the network traffic.
N-gram extraction A feature extraction technique counts occurrences of
all character combinations of size n, typically by linearly scanning the
data.
Network intrusion detection systems Network intrusion detection sys-
tems, are specially designed to focus on network related intrusions.
These systems are typically deployed at network gateways in organi-
zations, allowing them to act as filters for any incoming traffic.
Perceptron A type of artificial neural network that builds linear classifiers.
Predictive likelihood The confidence measure in Gaussian Processes, which
is the sum (or in some cases the average) logarithms of all predictive
posteriors.
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Radial basis function (RBF) kernel A kernel that applies a Gaussian
function to the pattern vectors, implicitly taking them to a higher
space.
Separating hyperplane A line (2-dimensions), or hyperplane (higher di-
mensions) that divides the training data into disjoint groups. Equipped
with a separating hyperplane, a classifier can then label a given test
data point based on its position relative to the hyperplane.
Signature Effectively a fingerprint that can be used to uniquely identify
intrusions, such as worms. In its simplest form, it consists of a string
of characters (or bytes).
String kernel A kernel, originally developed for categorising text docu-
ments, that maps the input strings into the feature space generated by
all sub-sequences of a given size, where it applies the inner product.
Supervised learning Learning with labelled training data.
Support Vector Machines A machine learning technique known to per-
form particularly well at pattern recognition tasks such as text cate-
gorisation and hand-written digit recognition.
Support vectors In Support Vector Machines, support vectors are the key
data points close to the hyperplane that, if removed, would change the
location of the hyperplane.
TCP/IP flow Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) packet streams, where a stream is identified by the
source Internet Protocol (IP) address, source port number, destination
IP address, and destination port number.
True negative Correctly classifying something as negative, for example,
classifying benign data as benign.
True positive Correctly classifying something as positive, for example, clas-
sifying malicious data as malicious.
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Unsupervised learning Learning with unlabelled training data, such as
clustering.
Worm Worms are malicious programs that spread themselves to hosts on
the Internet by exploiting vulnerabilities in software applications.
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